“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Top t
weapons by NATO in Pact field training exercises provide
opportunities to practice the skills necessary for effec-
tive CW employment. These agencies also note that
Pact forces are well prepared to operate in a CW
environment. They engage in extensive training which
routinely includes such realistic measures as conduct-
ing artillery practice and small unit exercises in full
protective suits. Pact forces have large numbers of
organic CBR defense personnel, and they are well
26. These agencies recognize, however, that the eupe ihmdr rtcieaddcnai
Pact's first use of chemicals before the onset of nuclear equipped with modern protective and decontami-
war cannot be entirely excluded. They believe that the nted equipment. These unpreceently large-scale
wrcman cte motiely txcue they Paci t hain t e preparations for operating in a CW environment are
circumstance most likely to cause the Pact to initiate especially significant in that they have been made in
chemical warfare during a conventional conflict
would be one in which the Soviets saw little possibility
of a successful Pact outcome without chemicals and 29. These agencies believe that the following con-
were prepared to risk having the conflict escalate to siderations would be likely to influence a Soviet
nuclear war. In deciding, the Soviets would consider decision on first use of chemical weapons in a conven-
the potential value of employing their superior chemi- tional conflict:
cal warfare capability and the possible benefits to be -The Soviets might view the risk of NATO nu-
derived from the surprise, shock effect, and destruc-
tive impact of its use against NATO troops. These clear r in toce lesspsignificantbecauseho
factors would be weighed against their assessment of conclude that NATO would not respond with
the likelihood and consequences of NATO retaliation nuclear weapons to Pact first use of chemical
with nuclear weapons. These agencies judge that,
under the present military circumstances, the Soviets weapons.
would rate this likelihood as high and would expect - The Soviets probably appreciate that mass em-
large-scale nuclear war to be the eventual outcome. ployment of chemical weapons at the outset of a
27. conventional war could facilitate penetration of
. They believe that, in the future, the Soviets' NATO defenses and permit the high rates of
appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they believed necessary for vie-
chemical weapons into a conventional conflict in advance wht b d s o
Europe is likely to be affected by their perception of tory in a short war.
the trends in the balance of their own and NATO's - They probably recognize that, as in nuclear
nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities. For exam- warfare, the element of surprise would offer
ple, should they conclude that NATO's ability and distinct advantages to the first user.
resolve to retaliate with nuclear weapons were signifi- - They might see their extensive capability in
cantly diminished, they might feel less constrained chemical warfare as providing them a decisive
against introducing chemical warfare. By the same amvantage in an area in which NA''O could not
token, they would be less inclined to initiate chemical catch up during a short war.
warfare-during either conventional or nuclear con-
flict-if they believed NATO had a well-developed These agencies believe that in the final analysis the
capability to defend against chemical attack and to . overriding factors governing first use of chemical
retaliate effectively with its own chemical weapons. weapons by the Soviets would be their assessment of
,, NATO's chemical warfare capabilities and the oper-28. The agencies holding the second view judge that advantages they expected to gain from such
Pact forces possess the resources to wage offensive CW
on a large scale. They recognize that the infrequency
with which Pact staffs apparently practice CW in D. Biological Warfare
large-scale field training exercises
could impact adversely on tiir effiiency m 30. All Warsaw Pact countries have signed the
conducting CW operations. However, tactical employ- Biological Warfare Convention prohibiting the pro-
ment of CW in divisional and lower field training duction, storage, and use of biological weapons. There
exercises and simulating the use of chemical weapons is no evidence that any of them have violated the
I-8
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