Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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weapons by NATO in Pact field training exercises provide
opportunities to practice the skills necessary for effec-
tive CW employment. These agencies also note that
Pact forces are well prepared to operate in a CW
environment. They engage in extensive training which
routinely includes such realistic measures as conduct-
ing artillery practice and small unit exercises in full
protective suits. Pact forces have large numbers of
organic CBR defense personnel, and they are well
26. These agencies recognize, however, that the eupe ihmdr rtcieaddcnai
Pact's first use of chemicals before the onset of nuclear equipped with modern protective and decontami-
war cannot be entirely excluded. They believe that the nted equipment. These unpreceently large-scale
wrcman cte motiely txcue they Paci t hain t e preparations for operating in a CW environment are
circumstance most likely to cause the Pact to initiate especially significant in that they have been made in
chemical warfare during a conventional conflict
would be one in which the Soviets saw little possibility
of a successful Pact outcome without chemicals and 29. These agencies believe that the following con-
were prepared to risk having the conflict escalate to siderations would be likely to influence a Soviet
nuclear war. In deciding, the Soviets would consider decision on first use of chemical weapons in a conven-
the potential value of employing their superior chemi- tional conflict:
cal warfare capability and the possible benefits to be -The Soviets might view the risk of NATO nu-
derived from the surprise, shock effect, and destruc-
tive impact of its use against NATO troops. These clear r in toce lesspsignificantbecauseho
factors would be weighed against their assessment of conclude that NATO would not respond with
the likelihood and consequences of NATO retaliation nuclear weapons to Pact first use of chemical
with nuclear weapons. These agencies judge that,
under the present military circumstances, the Soviets weapons.
would rate this likelihood as high and would expect - The Soviets probably appreciate that mass em-
large-scale nuclear war to be the eventual outcome. ployment of chemical weapons at the outset of a
27. conventional war could facilitate penetration of
. They believe that, in the future, the Soviets' NATO defenses and permit the high rates of
appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they believed necessary for vie-
chemical weapons into a conventional conflict in advance wht b d s o
Europe is likely to be affected by their perception of tory in a short war.
the trends in the balance of their own and NATO's - They probably recognize that, as in nuclear
nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities. For exam- warfare, the element of surprise would offer
ple, should they conclude that NATO's ability and distinct advantages to the first user.
resolve to retaliate with nuclear weapons were signifi- - They might see their extensive capability in
cantly diminished, they might feel less constrained chemical warfare as providing them a decisive
against introducing chemical warfare. By the same amvantage in an area in which NA''O could not
token, they would be less inclined to initiate chemical catch up during a short war.
warfare-during either conventional or nuclear con-
flict-if they believed NATO had a well-developed These agencies believe that in the final analysis the
capability to defend against chemical attack and to . overriding factors governing first use of chemical
retaliate effectively with its own chemical weapons. weapons by the Soviets would be their assessment of
,, NATO's chemical warfare capabilities and the oper-28. The agencies holding the second view judge that advantages they expected to gain from such
Pact forces possess the resources to wage offensive CW
on a large scale. They recognize that the infrequency
with which Pact staffs apparently practice CW in D. Biological Warfare
large-scale field training exercises
could impact adversely on tiir effiiency m 30. All Warsaw Pact countries have signed the
conducting CW operations. However, tactical employ- Biological Warfare Convention prohibiting the pro-
ment of CW in divisional and lower field training duction, storage, and use of biological weapons. There
exercises and simulating the use of chemical weapons is no evidence that any of them have violated the
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