Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Topsoa-t C. Chemical Warfare writers do treat the use of chemical weapons exten- 18. The Soviets are clearly planning for the contin- sively. gency that toxic chemical agents might be used in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They have a continuing, vigorous program to equip and train Pact forces for operations in a chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) environment. In addition, they have produced a variety of modern nerve agents and have the delivery systems and tactics necessary for the large-scale offensive use of these agents, but we do not 22. Whatever the circumstances of initial use, once know the size or the composition of the Soviet stock- offensive chemical warfare had been authorized, the pile of chemical agents and filled munitions. Pact's employment doctrine would lead it to attempt 19. to achieve surprise and to employ chemical weapons on a large scale in the hope of catching NATO troops Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons, unprotected. Prime objectives, for example, would be although they, like most other signatories, have re- to disable airfields, nuclear and logistic depots, and served the right of retaliation. Beyond that we have no command and control facilities. Other important ob- direct information on the Soviets' policy for use of jectives might include reduction of NATO's antiarmor chemical weapons and must infer their intentions capabilities and air defenses or stopping amphibious about the circumstances in which they might use landings. chemical weapons from their writings about the likely nature of a future war in Europe 23. Once widespread nuclear warfare had begun, the question of whether to use chemical weapons would be largely tactical. Pact writings on theater nuclear war usually assume that chemical weapons would be used also. In such circumstances, chemical weapons are thought to be a valuable complement to conventional and nuclear weapons, because their ef- 20. The Soviets categorize chemical wveapons-as teweaponss fects can be more widespread than conventional weap- heydo nuclear and biological weapons ons and they present fewer troop safety problems and of mass destruction' whose initial use must be author- produce fewer obstacles to friendly troop maneuver ized at the highest political level. All of the Pact's than do nuclear weapons. operational stocks of chemical weapons and agents are believed to be under Soviet control in peacetime. 24. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on Some are stored in Central Europe. The control and the first use of chemical weapons, there are two views release procedures for chemical weapons are not within the Intelligence Community. According to one necessarily the same as for nuclear weapons, and there view,' it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would is some evidence that, once released, chemical weap- initiate offensive chemical warfare (CW) before the ons would be subject to fewer restrictions on subse- advent of nuclear warfare, but the Pact's first use quent use than nuclear weapons. In addition, peace- under these circumstances cannot be entirely ex- time security over chemical weapons appears less eluded. According to an alternative view,' there is a rigorous than for nuclear weapons and is believed to strong possibility that the Pact would initiate CW in a be as much to prevent hazardous exposure as to conventional conflict. prevent unauthorized use. 25. The agencies holding the first view base their 21. In the extensive body of available Pact writings judgment on the evidence cited above and on their dealing with the likely nature of a future war in assessment of the risks and benefits which the Soviets Europe and addressing the broad strategic and oper- would consider in deciding whether to use chemical ational considerations for conducting conventional, T nuler adchemicaf warfare, there is no discussion The holders of this view are the central intelligence Agency nuclear, and cand the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart- of Pact intentions or plans to initiate chemical warfare snent of State. during a nonnuclear conflict. In other writings which 'lrhe holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence deal with tactical and technical problems of combat Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Senior without explicit reference to the overall situation, Pact Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. |-7 ~TsrSre+--
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.