Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Topsoa-t
C. Chemical Warfare writers do treat the use of chemical weapons exten-
18. The Soviets are clearly planning for the contin- sively.
gency that toxic chemical agents might be used in a
war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They have
a continuing, vigorous program to equip and train Pact
forces for operations in a chemical, biological, or
radiological (CBR) environment. In addition, they
have produced a variety of modern nerve agents and
have the delivery systems and tactics necessary for the
large-scale offensive use of these agents, but we do not 22. Whatever the circumstances of initial use, once
know the size or the composition of the Soviet stock- offensive chemical warfare had been authorized, the
pile of chemical agents and filled munitions. Pact's employment doctrine would lead it to attempt
19. to achieve surprise and to employ chemical weapons
on a large scale in the hope of catching NATO troops
Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons, unprotected. Prime objectives, for example, would be
although they, like most other signatories, have re- to disable airfields, nuclear and logistic depots, and
served the right of retaliation. Beyond that we have no command and control facilities. Other important ob-
direct information on the Soviets' policy for use of jectives might include reduction of NATO's antiarmor
chemical weapons and must infer their intentions capabilities and air defenses or stopping amphibious
about the circumstances in which they might use landings.
chemical weapons from their writings about the likely
nature of a future war in Europe 23. Once widespread nuclear warfare had begun,
the question of whether to use chemical weapons
would be largely tactical. Pact writings on theater
nuclear war usually assume that chemical weapons
would be used also. In such circumstances, chemical
weapons are thought to be a valuable complement to
conventional and nuclear weapons, because their ef-
20. The Soviets categorize chemical wveapons-as
teweaponss fects can be more widespread than conventional weap-
heydo nuclear and biological weapons ons and they present fewer troop safety problems and
of mass destruction' whose initial use must be author- produce fewer obstacles to friendly troop maneuver
ized at the highest political level. All of the Pact's than do nuclear weapons.
operational stocks of chemical weapons and agents are
believed to be under Soviet control in peacetime. 24. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on
Some are stored in Central Europe. The control and the first use of chemical weapons, there are two views
release procedures for chemical weapons are not within the Intelligence Community. According to one
necessarily the same as for nuclear weapons, and there view,' it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would
is some evidence that, once released, chemical weap- initiate offensive chemical warfare (CW) before the
ons would be subject to fewer restrictions on subse- advent of nuclear warfare, but the Pact's first use
quent use than nuclear weapons. In addition, peace- under these circumstances cannot be entirely ex-
time security over chemical weapons appears less eluded. According to an alternative view,' there is a
rigorous than for nuclear weapons and is believed to strong possibility that the Pact would initiate CW in a
be as much to prevent hazardous exposure as to conventional conflict.
prevent unauthorized use. 25. The agencies holding the first view base their
21. In the extensive body of available Pact writings judgment on the evidence cited above and on their
dealing with the likely nature of a future war in assessment of the risks and benefits which the Soviets
Europe and addressing the broad strategic and oper- would consider in deciding whether to use chemical
ational considerations for conducting conventional, T
nuler adchemicaf warfare, there is no discussion The holders of this view are the central intelligence Agency
nuclear, and cand the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
of Pact intentions or plans to initiate chemical warfare snent of State.
during a nonnuclear conflict. In other writings which 'lrhe holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
deal with tactical and technical problems of combat Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Senior
without explicit reference to the overall situation, Pact Intelligence Officers of each of the military services.
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