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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“Sea”60+ pages

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
lop t
Summary of Soviet Nuclear Responses as Reflected in Exercises Figure 1-3
Since the Mid-1960s
Soviet Responses
NATO First Nuclear Use in the 1960s in the 1970s
- Small-scale use (limited and selective) - Theaterwide strikes - Continuation of nonnuclear operations
- Not seen in Pact exercises since 1975 - Preemption if possible . Small-scale strikes (forward-based systems)
e Graduated escalation
. Theaterwide strikes
-Large-scale use (theaterwide strikes) -Theaterwide strikes -Theaterwide strikes
- Preemption if possible - Preemption if possible
57901iw e cu
Nonetheless, the
Soviets continue modernization of USSR-based pe-
ripheral strike systems
_rgues that they
still expect to have to resort to the use of these
weapons at some stage of theater nuclear war. Their
uncertainty about their actual ability to deter the West
from launching strategic nuclear strikes against Soviet
territory in the face of a successful Soviet conventional
assault-which is complicated by the existence of
independent French and British nuclear systems tar-
geted against the USSR-further argues against the
likelihood that the Soviets would anticipate much
success in achieving a decoupling strategy.
17. In writings,
Soviet military theorists still warn that escalation to the
intercontinental level would be likely and could occur
at any point during a theater conflict, conventional or
nuclear, although restriction to the theater level is not
ruled out. The Soviets probably see an advantage in
16. We have considered whether the Soviets have limiting the use of nuclear weapons to the theater
adopted a strategy of "decoupling" nuclear war in level, but they continue to plan and prepare against
Central Europe from the employment of peripheral the likelihood that theater nuclear war would involve
systems. We have found no direct evidence of such a strikes on the USSR and escalate to intercontinental
strategy in recent Soviet military writings or informa- conflict.'
tion from other human sources. However, the substan-
tial increases in the number and quality of Pact 'The potential effect of improvements in USSR-based strategic
tactical nuclear systems in Central Europe have pro- systems for peripheral attack, in concert with improvements in
Soviet intercontinental strike systems, on the possibility of decou-
pling theater nuclear war from intercontinental conflict is treated in
there at relatively high intensities without having to NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilitiesfor Strategic Nuclear Conflict
resort to USSR-based systems. Through the Late 1980s.
1-6
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.