Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
lop t Summary of Soviet Nuclear Responses as Reflected in Exercises Figure 1-3 Since the Mid-1960s Soviet Responses NATO First Nuclear Use in the 1960s in the 1970s - Small-scale use (limited and selective) - Theaterwide strikes - Continuation of nonnuclear operations - Not seen in Pact exercises since 1975 - Preemption if possible . Small-scale strikes (forward-based systems) e Graduated escalation . Theaterwide strikes -Large-scale use (theaterwide strikes) -Theaterwide strikes -Theaterwide strikes - Preemption if possible - Preemption if possible 57901iw e cu Nonetheless, the Soviets continue modernization of USSR-based pe- ripheral strike systems _rgues that they still expect to have to resort to the use of these weapons at some stage of theater nuclear war. Their uncertainty about their actual ability to deter the West from launching strategic nuclear strikes against Soviet territory in the face of a successful Soviet conventional assault-which is complicated by the existence of independent French and British nuclear systems tar- geted against the USSR-further argues against the likelihood that the Soviets would anticipate much success in achieving a decoupling strategy. 17. In writings, Soviet military theorists still warn that escalation to the intercontinental level would be likely and could occur at any point during a theater conflict, conventional or nuclear, although restriction to the theater level is not ruled out. The Soviets probably see an advantage in 16. We have considered whether the Soviets have limiting the use of nuclear weapons to the theater adopted a strategy of "decoupling" nuclear war in level, but they continue to plan and prepare against Central Europe from the employment of peripheral the likelihood that theater nuclear war would involve systems. We have found no direct evidence of such a strikes on the USSR and escalate to intercontinental strategy in recent Soviet military writings or informa- conflict.' tion from other human sources. However, the substan- tial increases in the number and quality of Pact 'The potential effect of improvements in USSR-based strategic tactical nuclear systems in Central Europe have pro- systems for peripheral attack, in concert with improvements in Soviet intercontinental strike systems, on the possibility of decou- pling theater nuclear war from intercontinental conflict is treated in there at relatively high intensities without having to NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilitiesfor Strategic Nuclear Conflict resort to USSR-based systems. Through the Late 1980s. 1-6 Top'crynt
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.