Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Io ecr.
USSR if the war were going badly for the Pact.
Accordingly, it is Soviet military policy to acquire and
maintain forces capable of successfully fighting a - Escalation of the intensity of nuclear strikes
nuclear war in Europe, to establish the command over time.
relationships necessary to control these forces, and to
formulate a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons
against NATO in a European conflict.
11. In the 1960s it was Soviet policy to retaliate
against any NATO nuclear initiative with a theater- the Sovi-
wide strike. By 1970, however, the Soviets had adopt- ets have at least considered the possibility of
ed a policy for more flexible use of nuclear weapons graduated escalation, either at their own discre-
against NATO. the tion or in response to NATO.
qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for
based tactical nuclear forces since 1970, reflect a more flexible use of tactical nuclear weapons, and
concerted program to improve the Pact's nuclear notwithstanding the impressive improvements they
flexibility and develop alternatives to the single option have made in forward-based tactical nuclear capabili-
of a theaterwide response to even a small-scale NATO ties, they have not sought to match NATO's capacity
use of nuclear weapons. Alternative responses that for accurate and selective use of very-low-yield nu-
have at least been examined include. clear weapons. Although they have evidently been
- Delayed responses to NATO's first small-scale working on nuclear artillery for at least 20 years and
use of nuclear weapons. have nuclear-capable artillery units in the western
USSR, they do not appear to have given high priority
to fielding it in Central Europe. Also, their armory of
tactical nuclear warheads has shown a strong trend
toward higher rather than lower yields.
Although the Soviets now have the necessary forces
and employment doctrines to conduct limited nuclear
war in Central Europe, we believe that they remain
skeptical of the possibility of controlling escalation.
Soviet planners may 13. In sum, we cannot predict how the Soviets
have begun to regard the limited, selective use of might respond to a limited and selective NATO first
nuclear weapons by NATO as a distinctive, if use of nuclear weapons or to their perception of
transitional, phase of conflict that would not NATO's preparations for the imminent use of nuclear
necessarily require an immediate nuclear weapons. They might conceivably continue purely
response nonnuclear operations, or they might respond with
small-scale nuclear strikes of their own. They might
- Responses at the lower end of the nuclear aloaucateariencersrk.
spectrum with small-scale strikes by forward- also launch a theaterwide nuclear strike.
based systems rather than with theajerwide
strikes involving USSR-based systems.
We have reliable evidence that
in 1970 the Soviets decided that NATO's selec-
tive use of tactical nuclear strikes may, in certain 14. Neither can we be certain of the circumstances
circumstances, make it necessary for the Soviets under which the Soviets might initiate nuclear oper-
to make corresponding strikes and that certain ations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
missile units must be kept ready for selective
strikes.
1-5
Top'Seret

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.