Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Io ecr.
USSR if the war were going badly for the Pact.
Accordingly, it is Soviet military policy to acquire and
maintain forces capable of successfully fighting a - Escalation of the intensity of nuclear strikes
nuclear war in Europe, to establish the command over time.
relationships necessary to control these forces, and to
formulate a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons
against NATO in a European conflict.
11. In the 1960s it was Soviet policy to retaliate
against any NATO nuclear initiative with a theater- the Sovi-
wide strike. By 1970, however, the Soviets had adopt- ets have at least considered the possibility of
ed a policy for more flexible use of nuclear weapons graduated escalation, either at their own discre-
against NATO. the tion or in response to NATO.
qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for
based tactical nuclear forces since 1970, reflect a more flexible use of tactical nuclear weapons, and
concerted program to improve the Pact's nuclear notwithstanding the impressive improvements they
flexibility and develop alternatives to the single option have made in forward-based tactical nuclear capabili-
of a theaterwide response to even a small-scale NATO ties, they have not sought to match NATO's capacity
use of nuclear weapons. Alternative responses that for accurate and selective use of very-low-yield nu-
have at least been examined include. clear weapons. Although they have evidently been
- Delayed responses to NATO's first small-scale working on nuclear artillery for at least 20 years and
use of nuclear weapons. have nuclear-capable artillery units in the western
USSR, they do not appear to have given high priority
to fielding it in Central Europe. Also, their armory of
tactical nuclear warheads has shown a strong trend
toward higher rather than lower yields.
Although the Soviets now have the necessary forces
and employment doctrines to conduct limited nuclear
war in Central Europe, we believe that they remain
skeptical of the possibility of controlling escalation.
Soviet planners may 13. In sum, we cannot predict how the Soviets
have begun to regard the limited, selective use of might respond to a limited and selective NATO first
nuclear weapons by NATO as a distinctive, if use of nuclear weapons or to their perception of
transitional, phase of conflict that would not NATO's preparations for the imminent use of nuclear
necessarily require an immediate nuclear weapons. They might conceivably continue purely
response nonnuclear operations, or they might respond with
small-scale nuclear strikes of their own. They might
- Responses at the lower end of the nuclear aloaucateariencersrk.
spectrum with small-scale strikes by forward- also launch a theaterwide nuclear strike.
based systems rather than with theajerwide
strikes involving USSR-based systems.
We have reliable evidence that
in 1970 the Soviets decided that NATO's selec-
tive use of tactical nuclear strikes may, in certain 14. Neither can we be certain of the circumstances
circumstances, make it necessary for the Soviets under which the Soviets might initiate nuclear oper-
to make corresponding strikes and that certain ations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
missile units must be kept ready for selective
strikes.
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