Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

TopSe rt
effort to meet these doctrinal requirements for con-
ducting conventional and nuclear offensives in the
European theater.- -s -- - -Figure I-1 b
7. Also among the key tactical concepts which
determine how the USSR would fight a war in Europe
Membership: Soviet Umon, Bulgara,'Cchooaka are force superiority, combined arms, and surprise.
East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania Albania Force superiority is something all military strategists
ceased participation in 1961, formally withdrew M 1968 hope to achieve, but the concept takes on exceptional
Obligations of Membership: Mutual defense of Furopan importance in current Soviet military thinking and
territores of member states Action in Europe against one practice. Its continuing role in Soviet planning is
member to be considered attack on all demonstrated not only by repeated doctrinal state-
Agreements Signed: Multilateral alliance formed by 1re ments, but also by Pact peacetime dispositions, by
- ty of Friendship Mutual Assistance; and Cooperation signed exercises, and by the size of the forces fielded for the
by eight original members at Warsaw in 1955 All remaining intervention in Czechoslovakia.
members also have bilateral mutual assistance treaties with
each other 8. Joint action by all components of the military
Soit Eforces is closely associated with that of force superior-
Soviet Forces m Eastern Europe: Presence governed by
bilateral status of forces agreements as well as in the case of ity. The Soviets reckon that successful conduct of a
East Germany atd Poland, by he Potsdanm Agreement of war with NATO will require the combined efforts of
1945 Strengths of Soviet forces (ground and air) are .-- their entire military establishment. Planning and prep-
East Germany 40000 Hungary '69000 arations for joint operations are manifest in the Pact's
Ciechoslovakia 75000 Poland } 48000 current force posture and training programs.
Bomansa engineered the ;withdrawal of Soviet troops (an 9. Finally, Soviet doctrine stresses surprise as a
estimated 35000),n 1958 Bulgaria allows a Soviet Warsa means to increase the likelihood of success of either
Pact element comprising only 100 to 150 senior staff officers,
under an unpublished agreement the details of which are not tactical or strategic military operations. Surprise in the
known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means-
Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in Moscw ut cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, and unex-
including various bodies which meet on occasion i other pected tactics, the main objective being to achieve
Pact capitals Soviet officers dominate all components but force superiority on the battlefield. While surprise and
other six Pact members are represented in'all administrative force superiority need not conflict, Soviet planners
and policymakng compo'nents recognize a potential trade-off between the two, as
Peacetime Control The Soviet commander i chief of the- when the chances of surprise are improved by limiting
Warsaw Pact does not directly control Pact forces in peace . force size or the size of the force is increased at the risk
time but his membership i all important bodies gives him of lessening surprise. While they would make every
considerable influence He also exerts influence through
wntten Pact' dirctives and personal dealings wvith East effort to maximize both, the Soviets are likely to favor
European Defense Ministers and General Staffs' As members force superiority: superiority in forces is real and
of Soviet high comand and as a first deputy minister of- affords advantages that are certain; surprise is a less
defense, he also has leverage with the Soviet.Ceneral Staff, tangible advantage and always runs some risk of being
which prepared Pact operational war plans The Pact chief . compromised.
of. staff, moreover, is one of two first deputy chiefs of the
Soviet G~eneral'Staff: e tB. Theater Nuclear Warfare
Wartime Control: In wartime the Pacts command struc
ture would be under the control of the Soviet High Com 10. Soviet leaders believe that the initial stages of a
-mand See chapter ItI for a detailed assessment of the Pact's conflict probably would be conventional, and they
wartime command structure would prefer that a NATO-Pact conflict remain non-
nuclear in order to avoid the catastrophic conse-
quences of nuclear war and to take advantage of their
superiority in conventional ground forces in Central
Europe. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the Soviets see a high
- m-- - probability that such a war would ultimately involve57900 so the use of nuclear weapons initiated either by the
United States to avoid defeat in Europe or by the
1-3
lop