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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
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CHAPTER I
WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR
THEATER WARFARE
A. General Considerations larger, global balance and, accordingly, are inclined to
L. It is Soviet policy to acquireand maintain forces be very cautious in the use of military force in Europe.
capable of successfully fighting either a nuclear or 4. Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground,
conventional war in Europe.' The Soviets take a air, and naval forces, as well as for those strategic
conservative view of NATO's military capabilities and attack forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets,
of the risks of instability in Eastern Europe. These are an important indicator of the USSR's emphasis on
concerns and their evident conviction that military developing and maintaining its theater force capabili-
power is a key element of a successful foreign policy ties. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that of
have led the Soviets, together with their Warsaw Pact total Soviet defense spending during the period 1967-
allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over NATO, 77, almost 40 percent was devoted to procurement and
especially in Central Europe, in important military operation of theater forces. (See figure 1-2.) Roughly
assets such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, and three-fourths of these outlays can in turn be directly
to strive continually to close the technological gap. attributed to those theater forces arrayed opposite
NATO. During this period, procurement of weapons,
2. The Soviets intend any future European conflict equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than
to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.
stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in ' Warsaw Pact military policy is synonymous with
place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets also Soviet policy. Soviet military policy is formulated at
conclude that the initial stages of a conflict probably the highest military and political levels and derives
would be fought with conventional weapons and that from Moscow's policies ith regard to its national
even in the event of massive nuclear exchanges, large security requirements, its conception of the nature of a
general purpose ground, air, and naval forces would be possible future war in Europe, and a desire to be the
needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and occupy predominant military force on the Eurasian continent.
Western Europe. In the Soviet view, Pact forces must be organized and
3. The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against a
pean allies as vital to its national interests. The East NATO attack to launching a theater offensive.
European members of the Pact provide sizable forces
and a territorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet 6. A1strong, in-depth defense of the homeland is
Union. (See figure 1-1.) The presence of or proximity basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow's war-fight-
of large, well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets ing strategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces
considerable leverage in exerting control over these protect the Soviet homeland and lines of communica-
countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of the Pact. tion so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be
The Soviets also value their military strength as a successfully carried out. We find no evidence of an
means of influencing European domestic and foreign intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend
policy decisions and deterring political or military territory. On the contrary, the hallmark of Soviet
developments which might alter the balance of power military doctrine is offensive action. It provides the
to hei diadvntge.Thedonot hwevr, easre motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on highto their dhisadlvantage. They (10 not, however, measurc oiefrebhn h oitepai nhg
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the combat readiness, the desire to seize the initiative, and
the requirement for substantial numerical superiority
For an expanded discussion of Soviet military policy in Europe, in the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to
see NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global ensure the momentuin of the attack. Pact theater force
Power Arena. developments over the past decade reflect a systematic
I-1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.