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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
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CHAPTER I
WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR
THEATER WARFARE
A. General Considerations larger, global balance and, accordingly, are inclined to
L. It is Soviet policy to acquireand maintain forces be very cautious in the use of military force in Europe.
capable of successfully fighting either a nuclear or 4. Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground,
conventional war in Europe.' The Soviets take a air, and naval forces, as well as for those strategic
conservative view of NATO's military capabilities and attack forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets,
of the risks of instability in Eastern Europe. These are an important indicator of the USSR's emphasis on
concerns and their evident conviction that military developing and maintaining its theater force capabili-
power is a key element of a successful foreign policy ties. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that of
have led the Soviets, together with their Warsaw Pact total Soviet defense spending during the period 1967-
allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over NATO, 77, almost 40 percent was devoted to procurement and
especially in Central Europe, in important military operation of theater forces. (See figure 1-2.) Roughly
assets such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, and three-fourths of these outlays can in turn be directly
to strive continually to close the technological gap. attributed to those theater forces arrayed opposite
NATO. During this period, procurement of weapons,
2. The Soviets intend any future European conflict equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than
to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.
stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in ' Warsaw Pact military policy is synonymous with
place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets also Soviet policy. Soviet military policy is formulated at
conclude that the initial stages of a conflict probably the highest military and political levels and derives
would be fought with conventional weapons and that from Moscow's policies ith regard to its national
even in the event of massive nuclear exchanges, large security requirements, its conception of the nature of a
general purpose ground, air, and naval forces would be possible future war in Europe, and a desire to be the
needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and occupy predominant military force on the Eurasian continent.
Western Europe. In the Soviet view, Pact forces must be organized and
3. The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against a
pean allies as vital to its national interests. The East NATO attack to launching a theater offensive.
European members of the Pact provide sizable forces
and a territorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet 6. A1strong, in-depth defense of the homeland is
Union. (See figure 1-1.) The presence of or proximity basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow's war-fight-
of large, well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets ing strategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces
considerable leverage in exerting control over these protect the Soviet homeland and lines of communica-
countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of the Pact. tion so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be
The Soviets also value their military strength as a successfully carried out. We find no evidence of an
means of influencing European domestic and foreign intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend
policy decisions and deterring political or military territory. On the contrary, the hallmark of Soviet
developments which might alter the balance of power military doctrine is offensive action. It provides the
to hei diadvntge.Thedonot hwevr, easre motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on highto their dhisadlvantage. They (10 not, however, measurc oiefrebhn h oitepai nhg
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the combat readiness, the desire to seize the initiative, and
the requirement for substantial numerical superiority
For an expanded discussion of Soviet military policy in Europe, in the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to
see NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global ensure the momentuin of the attack. Pact theater force
Power Arena. developments over the past decade reflect a systematic
I-1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.