“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Top
CHAPTER I
WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR
THEATER WARFARE
A. General Considerations larger, global balance and, accordingly, are inclined to
L. It is Soviet policy to acquireand maintain forces be very cautious in the use of military force in Europe.
capable of successfully fighting either a nuclear or 4. Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground,
conventional war in Europe.' The Soviets take a air, and naval forces, as well as for those strategic
conservative view of NATO's military capabilities and attack forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets,
of the risks of instability in Eastern Europe. These are an important indicator of the USSR's emphasis on
concerns and their evident conviction that military developing and maintaining its theater force capabili-
power is a key element of a successful foreign policy ties. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that of
have led the Soviets, together with their Warsaw Pact total Soviet defense spending during the period 1967-
allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over NATO, 77, almost 40 percent was devoted to procurement and
especially in Central Europe, in important military operation of theater forces. (See figure 1-2.) Roughly
assets such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, and three-fourths of these outlays can in turn be directly
to strive continually to close the technological gap. attributed to those theater forces arrayed opposite
NATO. During this period, procurement of weapons,
2. The Soviets intend any future European conflict equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than
to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.
stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in ' Warsaw Pact military policy is synonymous with
place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets also Soviet policy. Soviet military policy is formulated at
conclude that the initial stages of a conflict probably the highest military and political levels and derives
would be fought with conventional weapons and that from Moscow's policies ith regard to its national
even in the event of massive nuclear exchanges, large security requirements, its conception of the nature of a
general purpose ground, air, and naval forces would be possible future war in Europe, and a desire to be the
needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and occupy predominant military force on the Eurasian continent.
Western Europe. In the Soviet view, Pact forces must be organized and
3. The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against a
pean allies as vital to its national interests. The East NATO attack to launching a theater offensive.
European members of the Pact provide sizable forces
and a territorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet 6. A1strong, in-depth defense of the homeland is
Union. (See figure 1-1.) The presence of or proximity basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow's war-fight-
of large, well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets ing strategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces
considerable leverage in exerting control over these protect the Soviet homeland and lines of communica-
countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of the Pact. tion so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be
The Soviets also value their military strength as a successfully carried out. We find no evidence of an
means of influencing European domestic and foreign intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend
policy decisions and deterring political or military territory. On the contrary, the hallmark of Soviet
developments which might alter the balance of power military doctrine is offensive action. It provides the
to hei diadvntge.Thedonot hwevr, easre motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on highto their dhisadlvantage. They (10 not, however, measurc oiefrebhn h oitepai nhg
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the combat readiness, the desire to seize the initiative, and
the requirement for substantial numerical superiority
For an expanded discussion of Soviet military policy in Europe, in the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to
see NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global ensure the momentuin of the attack. Pact theater force
Power Arena. developments over the past decade reflect a systematic
I-1
Top au~