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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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CHAPTER I
WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR
THEATER WARFARE
A. General Considerations larger, global balance and, accordingly, are inclined to
L. It is Soviet policy to acquireand maintain forces be very cautious in the use of military force in Europe.
capable of successfully fighting either a nuclear or 4. Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground,
conventional war in Europe.' The Soviets take a air, and naval forces, as well as for those strategic
conservative view of NATO's military capabilities and attack forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets,
of the risks of instability in Eastern Europe. These are an important indicator of the USSR's emphasis on
concerns and their evident conviction that military developing and maintaining its theater force capabili-
power is a key element of a successful foreign policy ties. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that of
have led the Soviets, together with their Warsaw Pact total Soviet defense spending during the period 1967-
allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over NATO, 77, almost 40 percent was devoted to procurement and
especially in Central Europe, in important military operation of theater forces. (See figure 1-2.) Roughly
assets such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, and three-fourths of these outlays can in turn be directly
to strive continually to close the technological gap. attributed to those theater forces arrayed opposite
NATO. During this period, procurement of weapons,
2. The Soviets intend any future European conflict equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than
to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.
stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in ' Warsaw Pact military policy is synonymous with
place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets also Soviet policy. Soviet military policy is formulated at
conclude that the initial stages of a conflict probably the highest military and political levels and derives
would be fought with conventional weapons and that from Moscow's policies ith regard to its national
even in the event of massive nuclear exchanges, large security requirements, its conception of the nature of a
general purpose ground, air, and naval forces would be possible future war in Europe, and a desire to be the
needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and occupy predominant military force on the Eurasian continent.
Western Europe. In the Soviet view, Pact forces must be organized and
3. The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against a
pean allies as vital to its national interests. The East NATO attack to launching a theater offensive.
European members of the Pact provide sizable forces
and a territorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet 6. A1strong, in-depth defense of the homeland is
Union. (See figure 1-1.) The presence of or proximity basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow's war-fight-
of large, well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets ing strategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces
considerable leverage in exerting control over these protect the Soviet homeland and lines of communica-
countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of the Pact. tion so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be
The Soviets also value their military strength as a successfully carried out. We find no evidence of an
means of influencing European domestic and foreign intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend
policy decisions and deterring political or military territory. On the contrary, the hallmark of Soviet
developments which might alter the balance of power military doctrine is offensive action. It provides the
to hei diadvntge.Thedonot hwevr, easre motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on highto their dhisadlvantage. They (10 not, however, measurc oiefrebhn h oitepai nhg
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the combat readiness, the desire to seize the initiative, and
the requirement for substantial numerical superiority
For an expanded discussion of Soviet military policy in Europe, in the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to
see NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global ensure the momentuin of the attack. Pact theater force
Power Arena. developments over the past decade reflect a systematic
I-1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.