Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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CHAPTER I
WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR
THEATER WARFARE
A. General Considerations larger, global balance and, accordingly, are inclined to
L. It is Soviet policy to acquireand maintain forces be very cautious in the use of military force in Europe.
capable of successfully fighting either a nuclear or 4. Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground,
conventional war in Europe.' The Soviets take a air, and naval forces, as well as for those strategic
conservative view of NATO's military capabilities and attack forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets,
of the risks of instability in Eastern Europe. These are an important indicator of the USSR's emphasis on
concerns and their evident conviction that military developing and maintaining its theater force capabili-
power is a key element of a successful foreign policy ties. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that of
have led the Soviets, together with their Warsaw Pact total Soviet defense spending during the period 1967-
allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over NATO, 77, almost 40 percent was devoted to procurement and
especially in Central Europe, in important military operation of theater forces. (See figure 1-2.) Roughly
assets such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, and three-fourths of these outlays can in turn be directly
to strive continually to close the technological gap. attributed to those theater forces arrayed opposite
NATO. During this period, procurement of weapons,
2. The Soviets intend any future European conflict equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than
to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.
stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in ' Warsaw Pact military policy is synonymous with
place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets also Soviet policy. Soviet military policy is formulated at
conclude that the initial stages of a conflict probably the highest military and political levels and derives
would be fought with conventional weapons and that from Moscow's policies ith regard to its national
even in the event of massive nuclear exchanges, large security requirements, its conception of the nature of a
general purpose ground, air, and naval forces would be possible future war in Europe, and a desire to be the
needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and occupy predominant military force on the Eurasian continent.
Western Europe. In the Soviet view, Pact forces must be organized and
3. The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against a
pean allies as vital to its national interests. The East NATO attack to launching a theater offensive.
European members of the Pact provide sizable forces
and a territorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet 6. A1strong, in-depth defense of the homeland is
Union. (See figure 1-1.) The presence of or proximity basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow's war-fight-
of large, well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets ing strategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces
considerable leverage in exerting control over these protect the Soviet homeland and lines of communica-
countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of the Pact. tion so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be
The Soviets also value their military strength as a successfully carried out. We find no evidence of an
means of influencing European domestic and foreign intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend
policy decisions and deterring political or military territory. On the contrary, the hallmark of Soviet
developments which might alter the balance of power military doctrine is offensive action. It provides the
to hei diadvntge.Thedonot hwevr, easre motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on highto their dhisadlvantage. They (10 not, however, measurc oiefrebhn h oitepai nhg
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the combat readiness, the desire to seize the initiative, and
the requirement for substantial numerical superiority
For an expanded discussion of Soviet military policy in Europe, in the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to
see NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global ensure the momentuin of the attack. Pact theater force
Power Arena. developments over the past decade reflect a systematic
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