Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Top lanes for reconnaissance and attacks against shipping and naval targets of opportunity. Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling off major NATO naval bases to report on NATO movements and attack major warships. DIA and Navy believe that, in a typical initial wartime deployment, some 20 submarines would be positioned astride NATO's sea lines of communication to attack warships and ships carrying critical materiel to Europe in the initial phase of a war. The number of Soviet submarines dedicated to this effort would be scenario dependent. (IV, 168-169) r. Potential Effectiveness of Soviet Naval Operations in the North Atlantic. Paragraphs 191-197 of chapter IV consider that the evident technical limitations of the weapons and sensors on Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft could impact significantly on Soviet efforts to control the Norwegian and Barents Seas, although the mutually supportive aspects of some operations may offset certain technical weaknesses. DIA and Navy believe that these paragraphs should convey a more balanced appraisal of potential effectiveness and that, as now phrased, they tend to overstress the weaknesses of Soviet platforms; they tend to give inadequate consideration of strengths, including the operation of these platforms as a mutually supportive force; and they tend to assess effectiveness in tactical contexts which are unrealistic. (IV, 191-200) s. Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges that, under certain circumstances, nuclear operations at sea would not await employment of nuclear weapons on land. All other agencies estimate that the USSR would be unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at sea while a war was being fought with only conventional weapons against NATO in Europe. (V, 10-1.) t. Speed of New Soviet Nuclear-Powered Attack (SSN) and Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile (SSGN) Submarines. DIA and Navy estimate that the maximum speeds for some of the new SSN and SSGN classes could reach 37 knots. CIA estimates that these submarines will be capable of speeds up to 33 knots. (VI, 63) u. Effectiveness of the Soviet Aircraft Carrier Kiev and Its Impact Upon the Evolution of Soviet Naval Missions. CIA and State believe that a few ships of this class do not represent a significant improvement in Soviet capabilities to fight a war with NATO. They, and NSA, believe that, although it may constitute a major turning point in the development of the Soviet Navy, it is premature to judge the impact of the accqutisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval missions. DIA and Navy hold that the introduction of the Kiev 21
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.