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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
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which assumes that all submarines carry torpedoes 53 centimeters in
diameter (7.8 meters long). DIA believes that two 40-cm torpedoes (4.5
m long) probably could be substituted for each of up to six of the longer
torpedos in most classes, thereby substantially increasing wartime
torpedo loads. (II, 147)
j. Role of the Backfire Bomber. CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise participation of the Backfire, as well as
Soviet statements concerning this aircraft, point to peripheral strike as
its primary mission. DIA, Army, and Air Force estimate that the
Backfire is a long-range bomber with the capability to strike US targets
on unrefueled range and radius missions. They agree that it will have
significant peripheral missions but note that the Soviets have the option
to use the Backfire's intercontinental capabilities. Thus, in their view,
the Backfire poses a significant threat to the contiguous United States as
well as to areas on the Soviet periphery. The reader is referred to NIE
11-3/8-78 for information on performance data. (II, 178-179)
k. Capabilities of Soviet Motor Transport in Wartime. CIA and
State believe that the peacetime shortage of cargo vehicles in Category
II and III divisions and in army- and front-level motor transport units
and the heavy reliance in wartime on mobilized civilian trucks and
reservist drivers point to potential weaknesses in the wartime logistic
system, particularly in the early stages of a conflict. DIA and Army
believe that the Estimate understates the capability of wartime Soviet
motor transport. In support of this position they point out that the
mobilization system provides for filling out lower category units with
vehicles and drivers for war, that civilian trucks are often identical to
those in military service, that Soviet vehicles designated for mobilization
are inspected by military teams, that reservist drivers would be
performing duties related to their civilian occupation, and that the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany already has a lift capability that
exceeds its requirements. (II, 220-221)
1. Warsaw Pact Personnel Replacement System in Wartime.
CIA, State, and NSA judge that unit replacement is the Warsaw Pact's
preferred system for replacing combat personnel. DIA and Army
believe that the Pact would use both an individual and a unit
replacement system and that the system used in a particular case would
depend upon the situation. They further believe that individual
replacement would be used primarily in cases of steady, attrition-type
losses, while unit replacement would be used primarily in cases of large,
sudden losses. (II, 231-232)
in. Pact Initiation of War From a Two-Front Posture After Four
Days of Preparation. All agencies agree that, because four days would
allow only minimal preparations, which would entail serious risks, the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.