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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
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which assumes that all submarines carry torpedoes 53 centimeters in
diameter (7.8 meters long). DIA believes that two 40-cm torpedoes (4.5
m long) probably could be substituted for each of up to six of the longer
torpedos in most classes, thereby substantially increasing wartime
torpedo loads. (II, 147)
j. Role of the Backfire Bomber. CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise participation of the Backfire, as well as
Soviet statements concerning this aircraft, point to peripheral strike as
its primary mission. DIA, Army, and Air Force estimate that the
Backfire is a long-range bomber with the capability to strike US targets
on unrefueled range and radius missions. They agree that it will have
significant peripheral missions but note that the Soviets have the option
to use the Backfire's intercontinental capabilities. Thus, in their view,
the Backfire poses a significant threat to the contiguous United States as
well as to areas on the Soviet periphery. The reader is referred to NIE
11-3/8-78 for information on performance data. (II, 178-179)
k. Capabilities of Soviet Motor Transport in Wartime. CIA and
State believe that the peacetime shortage of cargo vehicles in Category
II and III divisions and in army- and front-level motor transport units
and the heavy reliance in wartime on mobilized civilian trucks and
reservist drivers point to potential weaknesses in the wartime logistic
system, particularly in the early stages of a conflict. DIA and Army
believe that the Estimate understates the capability of wartime Soviet
motor transport. In support of this position they point out that the
mobilization system provides for filling out lower category units with
vehicles and drivers for war, that civilian trucks are often identical to
those in military service, that Soviet vehicles designated for mobilization
are inspected by military teams, that reservist drivers would be
performing duties related to their civilian occupation, and that the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany already has a lift capability that
exceeds its requirements. (II, 220-221)
1. Warsaw Pact Personnel Replacement System in Wartime.
CIA, State, and NSA judge that unit replacement is the Warsaw Pact's
preferred system for replacing combat personnel. DIA and Army
believe that the Pact would use both an individual and a unit
replacement system and that the system used in a particular case would
depend upon the situation. They further believe that individual
replacement would be used primarily in cases of steady, attrition-type
losses, while unit replacement would be used primarily in cases of large,
sudden losses. (II, 231-232)
in. Pact Initiation of War From a Two-Front Posture After Four
Days of Preparation. All agencies agree that, because four days would
allow only minimal preparations, which would entail serious risks, the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.