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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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which assumes that all submarines carry torpedoes 53 centimeters in
diameter (7.8 meters long). DIA believes that two 40-cm torpedoes (4.5
m long) probably could be substituted for each of up to six of the longer
torpedos in most classes, thereby substantially increasing wartime
torpedo loads. (II, 147)
j. Role of the Backfire Bomber. CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise participation of the Backfire, as well as
Soviet statements concerning this aircraft, point to peripheral strike as
its primary mission. DIA, Army, and Air Force estimate that the
Backfire is a long-range bomber with the capability to strike US targets
on unrefueled range and radius missions. They agree that it will have
significant peripheral missions but note that the Soviets have the option
to use the Backfire's intercontinental capabilities. Thus, in their view,
the Backfire poses a significant threat to the contiguous United States as
well as to areas on the Soviet periphery. The reader is referred to NIE
11-3/8-78 for information on performance data. (II, 178-179)
k. Capabilities of Soviet Motor Transport in Wartime. CIA and
State believe that the peacetime shortage of cargo vehicles in Category
II and III divisions and in army- and front-level motor transport units
and the heavy reliance in wartime on mobilized civilian trucks and
reservist drivers point to potential weaknesses in the wartime logistic
system, particularly in the early stages of a conflict. DIA and Army
believe that the Estimate understates the capability of wartime Soviet
motor transport. In support of this position they point out that the
mobilization system provides for filling out lower category units with
vehicles and drivers for war, that civilian trucks are often identical to
those in military service, that Soviet vehicles designated for mobilization
are inspected by military teams, that reservist drivers would be
performing duties related to their civilian occupation, and that the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany already has a lift capability that
exceeds its requirements. (II, 220-221)
1. Warsaw Pact Personnel Replacement System in Wartime.
CIA, State, and NSA judge that unit replacement is the Warsaw Pact's
preferred system for replacing combat personnel. DIA and Army
believe that the Pact would use both an individual and a unit
replacement system and that the system used in a particular case would
depend upon the situation. They further believe that individual
replacement would be used primarily in cases of steady, attrition-type
losses, while unit replacement would be used primarily in cases of large,
sudden losses. (II, 231-232)
in. Pact Initiation of War From a Two-Front Posture After Four
Days of Preparation. All agencies agree that, because four days would
allow only minimal preparations, which would entail serious risks, the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.