“US Navy”42 pages
- p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO
or…
- p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
- p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
- p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise…
- p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets
might choose to attack with…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the
fully equipped…
- p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
- p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
- p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out
Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
- p. 84 …The
Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
- p. 85 …NATO
placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
- p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than
probably commit few bombers…
- p. 88 …As of 1975, however,
weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
- p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded
as only a partial solution to the…
- p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets
in NATO Europe, and the 150…
- p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
- p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the…
- p. 113 …Aboard
ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection
249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
- p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the
option of using merchant communications circuits for
command and control…
- p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
- p. 122 …Some common computer programs are
being used for logistics and battle management sup-
13. In wartime…
- p. 145 Top
Table IV-4
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
- p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing
Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
- p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than
were canceled…
- p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th
sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
- p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
- p. 154 …Many have
air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
- p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
- p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact,
however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
- p. 159 …They probably
Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept
Cruisers ... 1
Missile…
- p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise
missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
- p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft
missiles, thereby reducing the…
- p. 168 …the Soviets
would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close
proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
- p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
- p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit
could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
- p. 179 …Soviet Navy
inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
- p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
- p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in
Soviets clearly regard the US…
- p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
- p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
- p. 200 …T s copy
is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
e. Soviet Capability To Activate Reserve Submarines. CIA
estimates that no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought
to combat readiness in less than 90 days. DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status in 30
days and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. (II, 106)
f. Soviet Long-Range Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
Capability. CIA and NSA estimate that the TU-142 Bear-F aircraft has
an operational radius of about 2,050 nautical miles with three hours of
on-station time and about 2,500 nm with no on-station time. DIA, Navy,
and Air Force hold that the maximum radius with three hours of
on-station. time is 3,150 nm. (II, 131-132)
g. Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC).
CIA, NSA, and State judge that the Soviets would not likely attempt a
serious SLOC interdiction campaign unless they had previously
defeated NATO carrier and amphibious forces without losing their
submarines. NSA further believes that the extent and degree of an anti-
SLOG campaign is largely scenario dependent and that in a prolonged
crisis, where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC
interdiction in advance of a conflict goes up. DIA and Navy conclude
that the Soviets consider SLOC interdiction of such significance, and
their submarine inventory of sufficient size, as to warrant use of
substantial numbers of attack submarines in this effort while
accomplishing their other missions. (II, 142-146)
h. Soviet Capabilities To Execute a SLOC Interdiction Cam-
paign. CIA and State estimate that the USSR's ability to attack
merchant ships in the open ocean would be significantly constrained by
submarine torpedo loads, lack. of replenishment opportunities, turn-
around time, long transits, combat attrition, and limited target
information. DIA and Navy judge that these limitations are sensitive to
the timing, manner, and level at which hostilities begin, but in any
event are not sufficient to prevent the Soviets from mounting a
significant SLOC threat. (II, 147)
i. Torpedo Capacities of Soviet Attack Submarines. In support of
its position that Soviet SLOG interdiction capabilities are constrained by
submarine torpedo capacities, CIA has produced a table (table 1I-9)
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