Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
e. Soviet Capability To Activate Reserve Submarines. CIA estimates that no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought to combat readiness in less than 90 days. DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status in 30 days and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. (II, 106) f. Soviet Long-Range Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Capability. CIA and NSA estimate that the TU-142 Bear-F aircraft has an operational radius of about 2,050 nautical miles with three hours of on-station time and about 2,500 nm with no on-station time. DIA, Navy, and Air Force hold that the maximum radius with three hours of on-station. time is 3,150 nm. (II, 131-132) g. Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC). CIA, NSA, and State judge that the Soviets would not likely attempt a serious SLOC interdiction campaign unless they had previously defeated NATO carrier and amphibious forces without losing their submarines. NSA further believes that the extent and degree of an anti- SLOG campaign is largely scenario dependent and that in a prolonged crisis, where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a conflict goes up. DIA and Navy conclude that the Soviets consider SLOC interdiction of such significance, and their submarine inventory of sufficient size, as to warrant use of substantial numbers of attack submarines in this effort while accomplishing their other missions. (II, 142-146) h. Soviet Capabilities To Execute a SLOC Interdiction Cam- paign. CIA and State estimate that the USSR's ability to attack merchant ships in the open ocean would be significantly constrained by submarine torpedo loads, lack. of replenishment opportunities, turn- around time, long transits, combat attrition, and limited target information. DIA and Navy judge that these limitations are sensitive to the timing, manner, and level at which hostilities begin, but in any event are not sufficient to prevent the Soviets from mounting a significant SLOC threat. (II, 147) i. Torpedo Capacities of Soviet Attack Submarines. In support of its position that Soviet SLOG interdiction capabilities are constrained by submarine torpedo capacities, CIA has produced a table (table 1I-9) 18 T__ t
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.