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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
e. Soviet Capability To Activate Reserve Submarines. CIA
estimates that no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought
to combat readiness in less than 90 days. DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status in 30
days and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. (II, 106)
f. Soviet Long-Range Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
Capability. CIA and NSA estimate that the TU-142 Bear-F aircraft has
an operational radius of about 2,050 nautical miles with three hours of
on-station time and about 2,500 nm with no on-station time. DIA, Navy,
and Air Force hold that the maximum radius with three hours of
on-station. time is 3,150 nm. (II, 131-132)
g. Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC).
CIA, NSA, and State judge that the Soviets would not likely attempt a
serious SLOC interdiction campaign unless they had previously
defeated NATO carrier and amphibious forces without losing their
submarines. NSA further believes that the extent and degree of an anti-
SLOG campaign is largely scenario dependent and that in a prolonged
crisis, where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC
interdiction in advance of a conflict goes up. DIA and Navy conclude
that the Soviets consider SLOC interdiction of such significance, and
their submarine inventory of sufficient size, as to warrant use of
substantial numbers of attack submarines in this effort while
accomplishing their other missions. (II, 142-146)
h. Soviet Capabilities To Execute a SLOC Interdiction Cam-
paign. CIA and State estimate that the USSR's ability to attack
merchant ships in the open ocean would be significantly constrained by
submarine torpedo loads, lack. of replenishment opportunities, turn-
around time, long transits, combat attrition, and limited target
information. DIA and Navy judge that these limitations are sensitive to
the timing, manner, and level at which hostilities begin, but in any
event are not sufficient to prevent the Soviets from mounting a
significant SLOC threat. (II, 147)
i. Torpedo Capacities of Soviet Attack Submarines. In support of
its position that Soviet SLOG interdiction capabilities are constrained by
submarine torpedo capacities, CIA has produced a table (table 1I-9)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.