Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

e. Soviet Capability To Activate Reserve Submarines. CIA
estimates that no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought
to combat readiness in less than 90 days. DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status in 30
days and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. (II, 106)
f. Soviet Long-Range Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
Capability. CIA and NSA estimate that the TU-142 Bear-F aircraft has
an operational radius of about 2,050 nautical miles with three hours of
on-station time and about 2,500 nm with no on-station time. DIA, Navy,
and Air Force hold that the maximum radius with three hours of
on-station. time is 3,150 nm. (II, 131-132)
g. Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC).
CIA, NSA, and State judge that the Soviets would not likely attempt a
serious SLOC interdiction campaign unless they had previously
defeated NATO carrier and amphibious forces without losing their
submarines. NSA further believes that the extent and degree of an anti-
SLOG campaign is largely scenario dependent and that in a prolonged
crisis, where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC
interdiction in advance of a conflict goes up. DIA and Navy conclude
that the Soviets consider SLOC interdiction of such significance, and
their submarine inventory of sufficient size, as to warrant use of
substantial numbers of attack submarines in this effort while
accomplishing their other missions. (II, 142-146)
h. Soviet Capabilities To Execute a SLOC Interdiction Cam-
paign. CIA and State estimate that the USSR's ability to attack
merchant ships in the open ocean would be significantly constrained by
submarine torpedo loads, lack. of replenishment opportunities, turn-
around time, long transits, combat attrition, and limited target
information. DIA and Navy judge that these limitations are sensitive to
the timing, manner, and level at which hostilities begin, but in any
event are not sufficient to prevent the Soviets from mounting a
significant SLOC threat. (II, 147)
i. Torpedo Capacities of Soviet Attack Submarines. In support of
its position that Soviet SLOG interdiction capabilities are constrained by
submarine torpedo capacities, CIA has produced a table (table 1I-9)
18
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