“US Navy”42 pages
- p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO
or…
- p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
- p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
- p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise…
- p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets
might choose to attack with…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the
fully equipped…
- p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
- p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
- p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out
Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
- p. 84 …The
Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
- p. 85 …NATO
placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
- p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than
probably commit few bombers…
- p. 88 …As of 1975, however,
weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
- p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded
as only a partial solution to the…
- p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets
in NATO Europe, and the 150…
- p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
- p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the…
- p. 113 …Aboard
ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection
249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
- p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the
option of using merchant communications circuits for
command and control…
- p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
- p. 122 …Some common computer programs are
being used for logistics and battle management sup-
13. In wartime…
- p. 145 Top
Table IV-4
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
- p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing
Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
- p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than
were canceled…
- p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th
sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
- p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
- p. 154 …Many have
air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
- p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
- p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact,
however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
- p. 159 …They probably
Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept
Cruisers ... 1
Missile…
- p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise
missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
- p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft
missiles, thereby reducing the…
- p. 168 …the Soviets
would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close
proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
- p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
- p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit
could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
- p. 179 …Soviet Navy
inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
- p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
- p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in
Soviets clearly regard the US…
- p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
- p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
- p. 200 …T s copy
is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
ISSUES
During the preparation of this Estimate disagreements among NFIB
agencies arose on a number of issues-some key, most secondary-gists
of which are contained in this section. Parenthetical references at the
end of each gist are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs
(Arabic numbers) in this volume of the Estimate.
a. Likelihood of Soviet Initiation of Chemical Warfare in a
Conventional War. All agencies are agreed that, once widespread
nuclear war began, the Warsaw Pact would not be constrained in its use
of chemical weapons. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on
the first use of chemical weapons before the advent of nuclear war,
there are two views. CIA and State judge that it is unlikely the Pact
would initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force believe that there is a
strong possibility of such use. (I, 24-29)
b. Number of Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) That
Have an Independent Tank Battalion (ITB). NSA, Army, and Air
Force believe that all MRDs in Eastern Europe have an ITB. They base
their position on COMINT and Soviet classified writings. Army and Air
Force further believe that an ITB with an MRD would be standard in
wartime. DIA and CIA estimate that two-thirds of the Soviet MRDs in
Eastern Europe have ITBs but that few, if any, in the western USSR do.
They base their view on COMINT, Pact exercises, and the fact that
photography does not show independent tank battalions with other
Soviet MRDs in Eastern Europe and the western USSR. (II, 12)
c. Success of Soviet Career Noncommissioned Personnel Pro-
grains. All agencies agree that the Soviets are seeking to induce
conscripts to serve as career noncommissioned personnel upon
completion of their mandatory service. CIA, NSA, and State conclude
that the Soviets have had little success because of the harsh conditions of
military service. DIA, Army, and Air Force believe that there is
insufficient evidence to support conclusions about the planned scope of
the Soviets' recruiting programs or their success in implementing them.
They also believe that, with a combination of incentives on the one
hand and pressure from the political organization on the other, the
Soviets should be able to overcome any difficulties in recruiting career
enlisted personnel. (II, 44-45)
d. Amount of Combat-Related Training in Soviet Air Units
Stationed in East Germany.
17