Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
ISSUES During the preparation of this Estimate disagreements among NFIB agencies arose on a number of issues-some key, most secondary-gists of which are contained in this section. Parenthetical references at the end of each gist are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs (Arabic numbers) in this volume of the Estimate. a. Likelihood of Soviet Initiation of Chemical Warfare in a Conventional War. All agencies are agreed that, once widespread nuclear war began, the Warsaw Pact would not be constrained in its use of chemical weapons. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on the first use of chemical weapons before the advent of nuclear war, there are two views. CIA and State judge that it is unlikely the Pact would initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force believe that there is a strong possibility of such use. (I, 24-29) b. Number of Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) That Have an Independent Tank Battalion (ITB). NSA, Army, and Air Force believe that all MRDs in Eastern Europe have an ITB. They base their position on COMINT and Soviet classified writings. Army and Air Force further believe that an ITB with an MRD would be standard in wartime. DIA and CIA estimate that two-thirds of the Soviet MRDs in Eastern Europe have ITBs but that few, if any, in the western USSR do. They base their view on COMINT, Pact exercises, and the fact that photography does not show independent tank battalions with other Soviet MRDs in Eastern Europe and the western USSR. (II, 12) c. Success of Soviet Career Noncommissioned Personnel Pro- grains. All agencies agree that the Soviets are seeking to induce conscripts to serve as career noncommissioned personnel upon completion of their mandatory service. CIA, NSA, and State conclude that the Soviets have had little success because of the harsh conditions of military service. DIA, Army, and Air Force believe that there is insufficient evidence to support conclusions about the planned scope of the Soviets' recruiting programs or their success in implementing them. They also believe that, with a combination of incentives on the one hand and pressure from the political organization on the other, the Soviets should be able to overcome any difficulties in recruiting career enlisted personnel. (II, 44-45) d. Amount of Combat-Related Training in Soviet Air Units Stationed in East Germany. 17
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.