Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

ISSUES
During the preparation of this Estimate disagreements among NFIB
agencies arose on a number of issues-some key, most secondary-gists
of which are contained in this section. Parenthetical references at the
end of each gist are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs
(Arabic numbers) in this volume of the Estimate.
a. Likelihood of Soviet Initiation of Chemical Warfare in a
Conventional War. All agencies are agreed that, once widespread
nuclear war began, the Warsaw Pact would not be constrained in its use
of chemical weapons. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on
the first use of chemical weapons before the advent of nuclear war,
there are two views. CIA and State judge that it is unlikely the Pact
would initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force believe that there is a
strong possibility of such use. (I, 24-29)
b. Number of Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) That
Have an Independent Tank Battalion (ITB). NSA, Army, and Air
Force believe that all MRDs in Eastern Europe have an ITB. They base
their position on COMINT and Soviet classified writings. Army and Air
Force further believe that an ITB with an MRD would be standard in
wartime. DIA and CIA estimate that two-thirds of the Soviet MRDs in
Eastern Europe have ITBs but that few, if any, in the western USSR do.
They base their view on COMINT, Pact exercises, and the fact that
photography does not show independent tank battalions with other
Soviet MRDs in Eastern Europe and the western USSR. (II, 12)
c. Success of Soviet Career Noncommissioned Personnel Pro-
grains. All agencies agree that the Soviets are seeking to induce
conscripts to serve as career noncommissioned personnel upon
completion of their mandatory service. CIA, NSA, and State conclude
that the Soviets have had little success because of the harsh conditions of
military service. DIA, Army, and Air Force believe that there is
insufficient evidence to support conclusions about the planned scope of
the Soviets' recruiting programs or their success in implementing them.
They also believe that, with a combination of incentives on the one
hand and pressure from the political organization on the other, the
Soviets should be able to overcome any difficulties in recruiting career
enlisted personnel. (II, 44-45)
d. Amount of Combat-Related Training in Soviet Air Units
Stationed in East Germany.
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