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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“The Advance”37 pages

p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…

period of time may be required to integrate and consolidate advances
and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a
modest decline in the overall number of Soviet general purpose naval
ships and submarines but newer and more capable units will be
replacing older and less effective ones. (VI, 55)
29. Theater Nuclear Forces. Over the next decade the Soviets will
continue their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral strategic
strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance in battlefield nuclear
capabilities they perceive in the European theater. Force improvement
carried out to date and ongoing deployment of new systems are
increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can employ their
theater nuclear forces. The introduction of nuclear-capable artillery will
provide low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems with
sufficient accuracy to permit employment in close proximity to Pact
forces. (VI, 90)
30. Command, Control, and Communications. We estimate that
about one week currently would be required before the Pact's wartime
communications links could be established to theater-level headquarters
and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between
Moscow and the fronts and within the fronts, to control combat
operations by divisions and armies could be effectively established
within a few days. However, the Pact has two programs under way-
the creation of a centralized command structure and the establishment
of a unified communications system-which, during the period of this
Estimate, could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
command and control system prepared for war, The two programs are
intended to establish in peacetime the. theater-level (High Command)
resources needed to control Pact forces once the are released from
national control. We estimate that the centralized command structure
could be complete by the early 1980s. The unified communications
system could begin to improve the Pact's command capabilities by the
mid-1980s, but it is not scheduled for completion until 1990. (VI, 101)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.