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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979
Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
- p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such
as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais-
sance data link…
- p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have
missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
- p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
- p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either
broad range of missions…
- p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled
The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
- p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
- p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and
commanders are expected to be closely…
- p. 59 …Frontal
Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft
reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
- p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline…
- p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide
the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions
when…
- p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
- p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance
those two seas…
- p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control
110…
- p. 84 …this mission.
The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
- p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
- p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans
other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
- p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include,
sidual forces…
- p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and
integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
- p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links.
rated composite or…
- p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified
missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
- p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform
their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
- p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with
flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
- p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at-
and…
- p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob-
to cope…
- p. 175 …be building a
mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
- p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
- p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
- p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
- p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The
against US carrier and…
period of time may be required to integrate and consolidate advances
and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a
modest decline in the overall number of Soviet general purpose naval
ships and submarines but newer and more capable units will be
replacing older and less effective ones. (VI, 55)
29. Theater Nuclear Forces. Over the next decade the Soviets will
continue their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral strategic
strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance in battlefield nuclear
capabilities they perceive in the European theater. Force improvement
carried out to date and ongoing deployment of new systems are
increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can employ their
theater nuclear forces. The introduction of nuclear-capable artillery will
provide low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems with
sufficient accuracy to permit employment in close proximity to Pact
forces. (VI, 90)
30. Command, Control, and Communications. We estimate that
about one week currently would be required before the Pact's wartime
communications links could be established to theater-level headquarters
and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between
Moscow and the fronts and within the fronts, to control combat
operations by divisions and armies could be effectively established
within a few days. However, the Pact has two programs under way-
the creation of a centralized command structure and the establishment
of a unified communications system-which, during the period of this
Estimate, could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
command and control system prepared for war, The two programs are
intended to establish in peacetime the. theater-level (High Command)
resources needed to control Pact forces once the are released from
national control. We estimate that the centralized command structure
could be complete by the early 1980s. The unified communications
system could begin to improve the Pact's command capabilities by the
mid-1980s, but it is not scheduled for completion until 1990. (VI, 101)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.