Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
opposite NATO is expected to remain at or near its current level, while a modest decline is anticipated in the number of general purpose naval ships and submarines. (VI, 14) 25. Warsaw Pact nations will continue to improve the weapons and equipment in their theater forces opposite NATO. Major weapon production and deployment programs which are clearly in midstream are expected to continue. In addition, the Soviets will no doubt seek to develop some entirely new weapons and support systems. Certain of these systems, such as laser or television-guided munitions, are already in testing. Still other Pact weapons-such as enhanced radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may emerge in reaction to NATO weapons programs or force improvements. (VI, 15) 26. Ground Forces. Barring an agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), the number and disposition of Pact ground force divisions opposite NATO are likely to remain stable during the period of this Estimate, although expanded divisional organizations and the formation of new nondivisional units probably will account for moderate increases in manpower and equipment. We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact strategy of an armor-heavy offensive against NATO in Central Europe. Despite NATO's substantial and growing capability for antitank warfare, Pact planners will continue to regard the tank as the backbone of their ground assault forces. (VI, 17) 27. Tactical Air Forces. We believe that the number of fixed-wing aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite NATO will remain essentially unchanged over the next decade. Efforts to improve the quality of Soviet tactical aircraft and munitions are likely to continue, although the rate of new aircraft deployment is expected to slow as the Soviets meet their current force objectives. Furthermore, we expect the Soviets to continue improving their support and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link systems. We expect in the next decade that several additional Soviet and NSWP combat helicopter regiments, primarily for ground attack, will be formed. No major changes are expected in the number of fixed-wing aircraft in the NSWP air forces. NSWP equipment modernization will continue to proceed gradually and be driven largely by economic considerations. (VI, 34) 28. General Purpose Naval Forces. During the next decade, developments in the Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime missions. The Soviets will have mixed success with programs to correct shortcomings in submarine detection, fleet air defense, logistic support, and communica- tions. Developments over the past decade have been so rapid that a 15
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.