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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
opposite NATO is expected to remain at or near its current level, while
a modest decline is anticipated in the number of general purpose naval
ships and submarines. (VI, 14)
25. Warsaw Pact nations will continue to improve the weapons and
equipment in their theater forces opposite NATO. Major weapon
production and deployment programs which are clearly in midstream
are expected to continue. In addition, the Soviets will no doubt seek to
develop some entirely new weapons and support systems. Certain of
these systems, such as laser or television-guided munitions, are already
in testing. Still other Pact weapons-such as enhanced radiation
weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may emerge in reaction to
NATO weapons programs or force improvements. (VI, 15)
26. Ground Forces. Barring an agreement on mutual and
balanced force reductions (MBFR), the number and disposition of Pact
ground force divisions opposite NATO are likely to remain stable
during the period of this Estimate, although expanded divisional
organizations and the formation of new nondivisional units probably
will account for moderate increases in manpower and equipment. We
foresee no development over the next several years which would
appreciably alter the basic Pact strategy of an armor-heavy offensive
against NATO in Central Europe. Despite NATO's substantial and
growing capability for antitank warfare, Pact planners will continue to
regard the tank as the backbone of their ground assault forces. (VI, 17)
27. Tactical Air Forces. We believe that the number of fixed-wing
aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite NATO will remain
essentially unchanged over the next decade. Efforts to improve the
quality of Soviet tactical aircraft and munitions are likely to continue,
although the rate of new aircraft deployment is expected to slow as the
Soviets meet their current force objectives. Furthermore, we expect the
Soviets to continue improving their support and subsidiary systems such
as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais-
sance data link systems. We expect in the next decade that several
additional Soviet and NSWP combat helicopter regiments, primarily for
ground attack, will be formed. No major changes are expected in the
number of fixed-wing aircraft in the NSWP air forces. NSWP
equipment modernization will continue to proceed gradually and be
driven largely by economic considerations. (VI, 34)
28. General Purpose Naval Forces. During the next decade,
developments in the Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved
capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime missions. The Soviets
will have mixed success with programs to correct shortcomings in
submarine detection, fleet air defense, logistic support, and communica-
tions. Developments over the past decade have been so rapid that a
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.