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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power
Arena. We proceed from the premise that the developments we
currently observe in Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO
represent the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradually
improve the capabilities of these large standing forces. They are the
activities necessary to replace obsolete or wornout equipment and to
incorporate new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous Soviet
research and development program. They portend no large, short-term
change in the general size or character of these forces. (VI, 2)
23. Although we believe this to be a valid premise, we have
examined a number of factors which conceivably could alter it:
- Nothing in NATO's current or foreseeable defense programs is
likely to precipitate any major change in the level of Pact efforts.
Over the longer term, however, a large-scale deployment by
NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery system (such as a
ground-launched cruise missile) could cause an upswing in Pact
efforts, especially in air defense. (VI, 4)
- New Soviet leaders will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of
the present group, which is responsible for creating current Pact
forces and is committed to maintaining Soviet military strength
in Europe. The new leaders will likely seek to avoid moves that
would antagonize large segments of the military. (VI, 5)
- Despite the decline in Soviet economic growth and the economic
difficulties of such NSWP countries as Poland and Czechoslova-
kia, we find no evidence that suggests the Soviets will cut back
resources for theater forces. Indeed, we have reliable evidence
that some NSWP countries plan modest increases in defense
spending. (VI, 7)
- During the next decade the number of young people reaching
draft age each year will decline in most Pact countries, a trend
that will complicate the allocation of manpower between the
armed forces and industry, but this manpower squeeze is not
expected to produce any decline in military personnel strength.
(VI, 8-10)
- Despite continuing scientific advances we foresee no technologi-
cal breakthrough that could lead to a major change in either the
size or character of the Pact theater forces. (VI, 11)
24. Although the expansion in manpower which characterized Pact
theater forces during the mid-1960s and early 1970s has slowed, we
expect some gradual increase in manpower in Pact ground and air
combat units opposite NATO over the next decade as ongoing programs
are implemented. The overall number of ground and air combat units
14
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.