Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed from the premise that the developments we currently observe in Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO represent the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradually improve the capabilities of these large standing forces. They are the activities necessary to replace obsolete or wornout equipment and to incorporate new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous Soviet research and development program. They portend no large, short-term change in the general size or character of these forces. (VI, 2) 23. Although we believe this to be a valid premise, we have examined a number of factors which conceivably could alter it: - Nothing in NATO's current or foreseeable defense programs is likely to precipitate any major change in the level of Pact efforts. Over the longer term, however, a large-scale deployment by NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery system (such as a ground-launched cruise missile) could cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air defense. (VI, 4) - New Soviet leaders will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of the present group, which is responsible for creating current Pact forces and is committed to maintaining Soviet military strength in Europe. The new leaders will likely seek to avoid moves that would antagonize large segments of the military. (VI, 5) - Despite the decline in Soviet economic growth and the economic difficulties of such NSWP countries as Poland and Czechoslova- kia, we find no evidence that suggests the Soviets will cut back resources for theater forces. Indeed, we have reliable evidence that some NSWP countries plan modest increases in defense spending. (VI, 7) - During the next decade the number of young people reaching draft age each year will decline in most Pact countries, a trend that will complicate the allocation of manpower between the armed forces and industry, but this manpower squeeze is not expected to produce any decline in military personnel strength. (VI, 8-10) - Despite continuing scientific advances we foresee no technologi- cal breakthrough that could lead to a major change in either the size or character of the Pact theater forces. (VI, 11) 24. Although the expansion in manpower which characterized Pact theater forces during the mid-1960s and early 1970s has slowed, we expect some gradual increase in manpower in Pact ground and air combat units opposite NATO over the next decade as ongoing programs are implemented. The overall number of ground and air combat units 14 TopB-Sest
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.