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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“Mission Control”29 pages

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
- Soviet amphibious ships carrying up to a regiment of Soviet
naval infantry probably would attempt to seize limited objectives
along the northern Norwegian coast. Initial amphibious oper-
ations probably would be confined to the coast of Finnmark,
under conditions suitable for an early linkup with the ground
forces. (IV, 148)
- The Soviets probably would not attempt a large-scale airborne
assault in northern Norway, because. the demands for air
transport elsewhere against NATO probably would preclude
early use of a formation as large as a complete airborne division.
(]V, 154)
20. Soviet strategy in the North Atlantic calls for the early
establishment of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their
approaches. Implementation of such a strategy probably would involve
most of the Northern Fleet's submarines and virtually all of the surface
forces and aircraft in an effort to exclude NATO forces from the area.
The Soviets probably also plan some submarine operations farther into
the North Atlantic to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious
task groups and to divert NATO naval strength. The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea before they could launch their missiles. To this end they
probably would initiate submarine and air operations against NATO
naval forces as they exit their bases in Europe and possibly -against
SSBNs from US bases as well. In addition, at least some submarines
would attack shipping engaged in resupply and reinforcement of
Europe early in a war. There is disagreement in the Intelligence
Community over the extent to which the Soviets would wage an
interdiction campaign and over their capabilities for doing so. (IV,
157-200, and II, 142-149)
Theater Nuclear. Operations
21. The primary objective in Soviet tactical nuclear planning
appears to be the destruction of military targets, particularly NATO's
means for waging nuclear war. Limiting collateral damage does not
appear to be a main concern
Prospects for Warsaw Pact Theater Forces
22. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed analysis of the
factors that motivate the Soviets' military policy toward Europe and the
development of their theater forces. These factors are discussed in detail
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.