Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
- Soviet amphibious ships carrying up to a regiment of Soviet naval infantry probably would attempt to seize limited objectives along the northern Norwegian coast. Initial amphibious oper- ations probably would be confined to the coast of Finnmark, under conditions suitable for an early linkup with the ground forces. (IV, 148) - The Soviets probably would not attempt a large-scale airborne assault in northern Norway, because. the demands for air transport elsewhere against NATO probably would preclude early use of a formation as large as a complete airborne division. (]V, 154) 20. Soviet strategy in the North Atlantic calls for the early establishment of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their approaches. Implementation of such a strategy probably would involve most of the Northern Fleet's submarines and virtually all of the surface forces and aircraft in an effort to exclude NATO forces from the area. The Soviets probably also plan some submarine operations farther into the North Atlantic to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious task groups and to divert NATO naval strength. The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea before they could launch their missiles. To this end they probably would initiate submarine and air operations against NATO naval forces as they exit their bases in Europe and possibly -against SSBNs from US bases as well. In addition, at least some submarines would attack shipping engaged in resupply and reinforcement of Europe early in a war. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Community over the extent to which the Soviets would wage an interdiction campaign and over their capabilities for doing so. (IV, 157-200, and II, 142-149) Theater Nuclear. Operations 21. The primary objective in Soviet tactical nuclear planning appears to be the destruction of military targets, particularly NATO's means for waging nuclear war. Limiting collateral damage does not appear to be a main concern Prospects for Warsaw Pact Theater Forces 22. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed analysis of the factors that motivate the Soviets' military policy toward Europe and the development of their theater forces. These factors are discussed in detail 13
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.