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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
addition, at the onset of a war, air and naval attacks would
almost certainly be mounted against NATO forces in these areas
and in the Mediterranean. (IV, 116-125)
- The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish Straits as crucial to
the success of its maritime strategy in the Southwestern TVD.
(IV, 113)
- While the Soyiets might launch a limited offensive into eastern
Turkey, we have no evidence that they would undertake
operations against Iran during an initial phase. (IV, 123)
- Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean would begin at the
start of a war and would be aimed primarily at the destruction of
Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and aircraft
carriers. (IV, 131)
- While the most immediate threat would come from Soviet ships
and submarines already deployed in the Mediterranean,
numerically the most sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there
would come from missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft, despite
the fact that they would be operating without fighter escort. (IV,
135)
1:8. We have good evidence that as part of the offensive by the
Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would attempt to
secure control of the Black Sea,:support the movement of Pact ground
forces along the western littoral; and assist in seizing the Turkish Straits.
To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force, the Soviets probably would retain in the Black Sea at
least some of their. available larger combatants equipped for ASW and
with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins,
and Krivaks. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Community on
the numbers of large surface combatants which would be retained in
the Black Sea rather than deployed to the Mediterranean before the
outbreak of hostilities. (IV, 126 and 142-144)
19. In the Northwestern TVD our information indicates that:
- Initial Soviet objectives in the Northwestern TVD center on
ensuring freedom of action and uninhibited access to the open
ocean for Soviet naval ships and aircraft and on maintaining the
forward defense of the extensive complex of naval bases and
strategic installations located on the Kola Peninsula. (IV, 145)
- Initial operations by Soviet land forces probably would be
liinited to northern Norway. We have no evidence indicating
that the Soviets plan for a general offensive against Finland or
Sweden early in a. war. (IV, 150-153)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.