Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
addition, at the onset of a war, air and naval attacks would almost certainly be mounted against NATO forces in these areas and in the Mediterranean. (IV, 116-125) - The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish Straits as crucial to the success of its maritime strategy in the Southwestern TVD. (IV, 113) - While the Soyiets might launch a limited offensive into eastern Turkey, we have no evidence that they would undertake operations against Iran during an initial phase. (IV, 123) - Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean would begin at the start of a war and would be aimed primarily at the destruction of Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and aircraft carriers. (IV, 131) - While the most immediate threat would come from Soviet ships and submarines already deployed in the Mediterranean, numerically the most sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there would come from missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft, despite the fact that they would be operating without fighter escort. (IV, 135) 1:8. We have good evidence that as part of the offensive by the Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure control of the Black Sea,:support the movement of Pact ground forces along the western littoral; and assist in seizing the Turkish Straits. To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force, the Soviets probably would retain in the Black Sea at least some of their. available larger combatants equipped for ASW and with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins, and Krivaks. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Community on the numbers of large surface combatants which would be retained in the Black Sea rather than deployed to the Mediterranean before the outbreak of hostilities. (IV, 126 and 142-144) 19. In the Northwestern TVD our information indicates that: - Initial Soviet objectives in the Northwestern TVD center on ensuring freedom of action and uninhibited access to the open ocean for Soviet naval ships and aircraft and on maintaining the forward defense of the extensive complex of naval bases and strategic installations located on the Kola Peninsula. (IV, 145) - Initial operations by Soviet land forces probably would be liinited to northern Norway. We have no evidence indicating that the Soviets plan for a general offensive against Finland or Sweden early in a. war. (IV, 150-153) 12 Top -'
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.