“US Navy”42 pages
- p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO
or…
- p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
- p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
- p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise…
- p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets
might choose to attack with…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the
fully equipped…
- p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
- p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
- p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out
Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
- p. 84 …The
Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
- p. 85 …NATO
placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
- p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than
probably commit few bombers…
- p. 88 …As of 1975, however,
weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
- p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded
as only a partial solution to the…
- p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets
in NATO Europe, and the 150…
- p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
- p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the…
- p. 113 …Aboard
ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection
249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
- p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the
option of using merchant communications circuits for
command and control…
- p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
- p. 122 …Some common computer programs are
being used for logistics and battle management sup-
13. In wartime…
- p. 145 Top
Table IV-4
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
- p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing
Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
- p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than
were canceled…
- p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th
sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
- p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
- p. 154 …Many have
air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
- p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
- p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact,
however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
- p. 159 …They probably
Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept
Cruisers ... 1
Missile…
- p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise
missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
- p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft
missiles, thereby reducing the…
- p. 168 …the Soviets
would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close
proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
- p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
- p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit
could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
- p. 179 …Soviet Navy
inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
- p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
- p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in
Soviets clearly regard the US…
- p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
- p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
- p. 200 …T s copy
is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
(G-I-UK) gap probably would be designated a Maritime TVD, and
would include the Northern Fleet. The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control of the
Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High
Commands by the Soviets. The senior field command would be the
front, an organization which is similar to a NATO army group in size,
level of command, and function and which consists of three to five
ground armies and an air army of 600 aircraft. (III, 7-10)
16. Our consideration of likely Pact operations in the Western TVD
during the initial phase of a conventional war has resulted in the
following key findings:
- Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and rapid ground
offensive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat
NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports
and airfields to prevent reinforcement. (IV, 7)
- Except in extraordinarily urgent circumstances, the Pact would
prefer to prepare at least a three-front force before initiating
hostilities in Central Europe. We believe the Pact would begin to
organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the
time of the decision to go to full readiness. There is virtually no
chance the Soviets would attack from a standing start.' (IV, 10-
22)
- Pact planners regard early attainment of air superiority and
destruction of much of NATO's tactical nuclear forces to be
critical to the Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Pact
plans to achieve these objectives by conducting a large-scale,
theaterwide conventional air offensive during the first several
days of hostilities. (IV, 43-85)
- The broad objectives of Pact naval operations in the Baltic would
be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea and access to the
North Sea to sever NATO's lines of communication in the North
Sea, and deprive NATO of potential launch areas for carrier
strikes against Pact air and ground, forces in the Central Region.
Failure to obtain air superiority and sea control probably would
force the Pact to reconsider its planned amphibious operations in
the western Baltic. (IV, 86-111)
17. As for operations in the Southwestern TVD, our conclusions are
as follows:
- The Pact would confine its initial ground operations to the
Turkish Straits area, Austria, and possibly eastern Turkey. In
' NIE 4-1-78, Warsaw Pact Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning
of War, provides the detailed rationale for these conclusions.
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