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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
(G-I-UK) gap probably would be designated a Maritime TVD, and
would include the Northern Fleet. The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control of the
Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High
Commands by the Soviets. The senior field command would be the
front, an organization which is similar to a NATO army group in size,
level of command, and function and which consists of three to five
ground armies and an air army of 600 aircraft. (III, 7-10)
16. Our consideration of likely Pact operations in the Western TVD
during the initial phase of a conventional war has resulted in the
following key findings:
- Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and rapid ground
offensive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat
NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports
and airfields to prevent reinforcement. (IV, 7)
- Except in extraordinarily urgent circumstances, the Pact would
prefer to prepare at least a three-front force before initiating
hostilities in Central Europe. We believe the Pact would begin to
organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the
time of the decision to go to full readiness. There is virtually no
chance the Soviets would attack from a standing start.' (IV, 10-
22)
- Pact planners regard early attainment of air superiority and
destruction of much of NATO's tactical nuclear forces to be
critical to the Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Pact
plans to achieve these objectives by conducting a large-scale,
theaterwide conventional air offensive during the first several
days of hostilities. (IV, 43-85)
- The broad objectives of Pact naval operations in the Baltic would
be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea and access to the
North Sea to sever NATO's lines of communication in the North
Sea, and deprive NATO of potential launch areas for carrier
strikes against Pact air and ground, forces in the Central Region.
Failure to obtain air superiority and sea control probably would
force the Pact to reconsider its planned amphibious operations in
the western Baltic. (IV, 86-111)
17. As for operations in the Southwestern TVD, our conclusions are
as follows:
- The Pact would confine its initial ground operations to the
Turkish Straits area, Austria, and possibly eastern Turkey. In
' NIE 4-1-78, Warsaw Pact Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning
of War, provides the detailed rationale for these conclusions.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.