Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
(G-I-UK) gap probably would be designated a Maritime TVD, and would include the Northern Fleet. The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The senior field command would be the front, an organization which is similar to a NATO army group in size, level of command, and function and which consists of three to five ground armies and an air army of 600 aircraft. (III, 7-10) 16. Our consideration of likely Pact operations in the Western TVD during the initial phase of a conventional war has resulted in the following key findings: - Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and rapid ground offensive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent reinforcement. (IV, 7) - Except in extraordinarily urgent circumstances, the Pact would prefer to prepare at least a three-front force before initiating hostilities in Central Europe. We believe the Pact would begin to organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the time of the decision to go to full readiness. There is virtually no chance the Soviets would attack from a standing start.' (IV, 10- 22) - Pact planners regard early attainment of air superiority and destruction of much of NATO's tactical nuclear forces to be critical to the Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Pact plans to achieve these objectives by conducting a large-scale, theaterwide conventional air offensive during the first several days of hostilities. (IV, 43-85) - The broad objectives of Pact naval operations in the Baltic would be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea and access to the North Sea to sever NATO's lines of communication in the North Sea, and deprive NATO of potential launch areas for carrier strikes against Pact air and ground, forces in the Central Region. Failure to obtain air superiority and sea control probably would force the Pact to reconsider its planned amphibious operations in the western Baltic. (IV, 86-111) 17. As for operations in the Southwestern TVD, our conclusions are as follows: - The Pact would confine its initial ground operations to the Turkish Straits area, Austria, and possibly eastern Turkey. In ' NIE 4-1-78, Warsaw Pact Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War, provides the detailed rationale for these conclusions. 11 Top ~s.a
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.