“The Advance”37 pages
- p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power
Arena. We proceed…
- p. 25 …We
foresee no development over the next several years which would
appreciably alter the basic Pact…
- p. 26 …advances
and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a
modest decline in the…
- p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC
interdiction in advance of a…
- p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
- p. 40 …permit the high rates of
appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
- p. 46 …The holders
sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
- p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick
difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
- p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
- p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to
units. The Soviets believe that a…
- p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in
irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
- p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
- p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
- p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning
but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
- p. 108 …the ability to sustain
the momentum of an advance is determined not only
by the availability…
- p. 112 Top e
ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
- p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced
notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin-
ning of…
- p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con-
man…
- p. 126 …advance, Pact
planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
- p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis
up…
- p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using
advance or exploitation along…
- p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to
Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
- p. 147 …surface ships into the
important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
- p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.
attack…
- p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
- p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea
these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
- p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the
several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
- p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
- p. 172 …The changes will improve
radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
- p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
- p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers.
for these…
- p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans-
survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
- p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable
units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
- p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
- p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced
82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
- p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic
ture. The VAKSS…
- p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that
advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
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