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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Moreover, there would be political considerations that would lead the
Soviets to defer attacks on some NATO countries in the hope of
encouraging their nonbelligerence. (IV, 2-4)
12. We believe that the need for unfettered naval operations from
their Northern Fleet bases would almost certainly cause the Soviets to
strike NATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably to attempt to
occupy some territory there, and that the urgency of this need would
lead them to do so concurrently with starting an attack in Central
Europe. We would also expect concurrent attacks on US naval forces in
the Mediterranean. None of the other potential flank offensives appear
to have that degree of urgency, although the Pact would be likely to
move against the Turkish Straits early in a war. (IV, 5)
13. The Warsaw Pact's success in achieving its wartime objectives
would depend on its ability to control and coordinate multinational
joint-service operations of great complexity.
but our
assessment of the systems strengths and weaknesses leads us to judge
that it is adequate to alert forces and control mobilization, and to
control combat operations. This assessment is discussed in detail in
chapter III. (III, 1-31)
14. The ultimate authority for the direction of the Soviet military
rests with the Politburo and the Soviet General Staff, but we believe
that should a war occur between the Warsaw Pact and NATO,
theater-level commands would be established and exercise direct
operational control over fronts and fleets and at least some degree of
control over those strategic assets allocated to support theater
operations. Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater
headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened command posts
have been constructed for at least some Pact wartime headquarters. (III,
4-6)
15. Arrangements for exercising control of Pact forces within what
the Soviets call the Western (or European) Theater of War have been
evolving over the last few years. We now have evidence that indicates
the commander in chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw
Pact would control all Pact forces in this theater in wartime. The Soviets
plan to divide the Western Theater of War into three land Theaters of
Military Operations (TVDs) in which they expect Pact and NATO
forces to come in conflict. These would include a Northwestern TVD
(the Leningrad Military District and the Scandinavian Peninsula); a
Western TVD (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the western
USSR in the east and West Germany, the Benelux countries, Denmark,
and possibly France in the west); and a Southwestern TVD (Greece,
Turkey, and probably northern Italy and Austria). An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.