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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Table 13-3
Disposition of Warsaw Pact Tactical helicopter Forces,
January 1979
ombathtIleli-orte
Grotlnd Attack b AssaulTrampail Supptl Helicopters I
Total Total Total
aGround Alouete Assault Alouette Total Total Fast Crand
MI 2-2 Attack Ml-1/2 M-i4 NIl-8 Mb6 M[-10 III Tranortor MI-1/2 MI- MI-8 KA-26 III Puma MI-6 MI-10 Supoert Soviet European Total
Oromile NATO Central It-ion
East European ........ .... 25 -- 25 225 110 75 - - -- 410 50 20 5 - -- - - - 75 - 510 . 510
Soviet - - - 15 230 245 5 25 2J5 95 5 - 425- 330 25 160 -.-. - - 45 - 560 1.230 - 1.230
Total OtositCentral lcgion 40 230 270 230 135 370 95 5 - 835 380 45 165 - - - -- 45 -- 635 1,230 510 1.740
Helicopterson NATO's Flanks
East Eurotpran . --- - -- 40 30 60 - - 15 14S5 In 5 5 15 5 Io - - 50 - 195 - 195
Sonvi... . .. . -. 40 40 -- 22 25U 135 - - 405 155 10 65 -- - - 5 - 235 680 - 680
Total on NATO's Flanks . - 40 40 0 50 310 135 -- 15 550 165 15 70 15 5 IC 5 - 285 680 195 875
Other SovIet Helicoters
in Eatern USSi.... -- 1.15 15 15 63 295 95 5 - 475 175 40 120 - - - 20 5 360 950 - 950
Ebehret- -. .-- 25 25 5 10 125 55 - - 195 30 15 30 - -- - 5 -- 80 300 - 300
Total Other Soviet Ieos -. - 140 140 20 75 420 150 5 - 670 205 55 150 - -- -- 25 5 440 1,250 - 1,250
Total Warswra. ....-.-..... 41 410 450 200 260 11100 380 10 15 2,055 750 115 385 15 5 10 75 5 1,360 3,160 705 385
0f rwhich
Soviet ........... _... ....... 15 410 425 25 120 A65 380 10 - 1.500 600 90 375 - - - 75 5 1.235 3.160 - 3.160
East European .....-.- .. 25 - 25 265 140 135 -- --- 15 555 0 25 10 15 5 10 - 125 - 705 705
Inhlrdesall helicpters (exetol thote sedas trans, in storage,in maintenance,or In repair deptts) assigned to Warsaw IIncludesonly thosehelicoptersasgnd to tells which haoe a prmasy mission of ftrasporting tssal toops and theil
Pact tacticalair forces.Does not include helicoptersassionedto national ai defense and n aval forces. associatedcargointoan obietivc area.This designationdoes not necemsarilyelude the capability to perform othercombatorIIncludesonly thoe, helicopters assignedto units which hta a primary misio of attackisgground targetswith rockets, lartt missions.
haohr ad/or unat This designationdoes not nesessaily e.clude the capability to perform other embat or siprtmsions. 4 Includesonlyt hse helicoptersasiged to unitswhich have primarymissionsof aupportto combat operationsby erovidint
services such as logistic support,reconuaissanceartillerystortinr,medicalevacuation.communicationsrelay, eletronic worfare,
or aidorne, commad Posts. This designationdoes not necessarily exclude the capability to perform combaltriions.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.