Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Top Stet - Since the late 1960s the Pact has adopted a unified command and control doctrine and has begun to modernize its command and control procedures and equipment. (1, 41) - Pact ground force logistic capacity has also been improved, notably by large additions to motor transport and the development of improved support organizations and equipment. (1, 42) 10. We have also identified the following significant weaknesses which could adversely affect the performance of Pact theater forces:' - Pact tactical air pilots are not as effectively trained-by US standards-as they should be to exploit fully the capabilities of. the airframes and weapon systems of the third-generation aircraft currently in operation. (II, 69) - Lack of automated equipment, or other means for timely and accurate location and reporting of mobile or semimobile targets, is believed to be a current weakness of Soviet aerial reconnais- sance. (II, 86) - The USSR's antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities on the whole are such that its forces in most wartime situations would probably be unable to detect the presence of US and most other NATO submarines before attacks on Soviet surface ships. Crucial shortcomings are lack of long-range submarine detection devices, high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative to those of the West, and lack of seaborne tactical air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces. (II, 128) Warsaw Pact Strategy for Initial Conventional Operations Against NATO 11. The USSR has developed contingency plans for military. operations on all Pact land frontiers. The Soviets clearly expect Central Europe to be the decisive arena in a war with NATO and assign it the highest priority in the allocation of military manpower and equipment. The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in other NATO regions, but we have little direct evidence on the Pact's view of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an offensive in Central.Europe. We judge, however, that the Pact. would be unlikely to start a war by mounting major ground offensives against all NATO sectors simulta- neously. To do so would unnecessarily extend available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic support and would complicate command and control at the General Staff and Supreme High Command levels. Additional weaknesses which some agencies have identified can be found in the "Issues" section on pages 17-22 and in the discussions of those issues in the body of the Estimate. 9 lop S~
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.