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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
a few surface combatants, a torpedo-attack submarine, coincident with visits of Soviet naval ships. The Soviets
and several auxiliaries. In addition, a number of Soviet would probably consider any major operations in the
naval auxiliaries regularly deploy to the South Atlantic Caribbean infeasible.
for intelligence collection and research operations.
Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea and 26. Whether Cuba would initiate hostilities against
occasionally some units en route to the Indian Ocean the United States during the early stages of a European
occaionllysomunts n ruteto he ndin Oean war would be primarily Havana's decision. In our
reprovision at Conakry, but Soviet use of support wr would be na'sd o Inpour
facilities ashore there remains limited. The Soviet view, however, the Soviets would be unlikely to expect
Navyalsousesportfacilitiesashoretains B e d A obt a significant Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but the Warsaw Pact. Cuba lacks the resources to transport
couldn e t alarge forces overseas, and those already deployed
Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft occasionally aroa or eresu wh the Soviewould
deply t AnolaUs ofthee arcrftin onjnctoi1 abroad would require support which the Soviets would
deploy to Angola. Use of these aircraft, in conjunction find extremely difficult to provide. While the Cuban
with others operating from Cuba, could provide the armed forces have been equipped for many years with
Soviets with a reconnaissance capability in the South armednforcesdhavefbee epors
Atlantic in the opening stages of a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few
recently introduced Flogger interceptor and ground
not count on continued access during a war, attack aircraft) capable of striking the southern United
States or US forces in the Caribbean, Castro would
Operations in the Caribbean have to consider that offensive actions against the
United States during the early stages of a NATO-
25. The Soviets have military advisers in Cuba and Warsaw Pact war could result in decisive US
send some personnel there to train, but -they have no retaliation."
ground, air, or naval units permanently stationed --
there. Naval deployments of about 30 days are made The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
approximately every six months, mostly from the the Army, would note that another important aspect of the recent
appterxi Bal iev e s m , mintroduction of Flogger ground attack aircraft lies in the fact that
Northern and Baltic Fleets. A typical force consists of it could presage the introduction of these aircraft in more
two surface combatants, one or two submarines, and a significant numbers. In the context of a NATO-Pact war, these
logistic ship. The force makes port calls in Havana and aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots, could conceivably be used in
Cienfuegos for provisioning and crew rest, and some attacks against ground targets throughout the Caribbean basin, to
include the southeastern United States. While the Soviets wouldunits exercise with the Cuban Navy and make brief have to calculate the response such attacks would incur, the
excursions into the Gulf of Mexico. Bear D reconnais- prospect that they are developing such a capability should not be
sance aircraft regularly deploy to Havana, sometimes overlooked.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.