Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
a few surface combatants, a torpedo-attack submarine, coincident with visits of Soviet naval ships. The Soviets and several auxiliaries. In addition, a number of Soviet would probably consider any major operations in the naval auxiliaries regularly deploy to the South Atlantic Caribbean infeasible. for intelligence collection and research operations. Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea and 26. Whether Cuba would initiate hostilities against occasionally some units en route to the Indian Ocean the United States during the early stages of a European occaionllysomunts n ruteto he ndin Oean war would be primarily Havana's decision. In our reprovision at Conakry, but Soviet use of support wr would be na'sd o Inpour facilities ashore there remains limited. The Soviet view, however, the Soviets would be unlikely to expect Navyalsousesportfacilitiesashoretains B e d A obt a significant Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but the Warsaw Pact. Cuba lacks the resources to transport couldn e t alarge forces overseas, and those already deployed Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft occasionally aroa or eresu wh the Soviewould deply t AnolaUs ofthee arcrftin onjnctoi1 abroad would require support which the Soviets would deploy to Angola. Use of these aircraft, in conjunction find extremely difficult to provide. While the Cuban with others operating from Cuba, could provide the armed forces have been equipped for many years with Soviets with a reconnaissance capability in the South armednforcesdhavefbee epors Atlantic in the opening stages of a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger interceptor and ground not count on continued access during a war, attack aircraft) capable of striking the southern United States or US forces in the Caribbean, Castro would Operations in the Caribbean have to consider that offensive actions against the United States during the early stages of a NATO- 25. The Soviets have military advisers in Cuba and Warsaw Pact war could result in decisive US send some personnel there to train, but -they have no retaliation." ground, air, or naval units permanently stationed -- there. Naval deployments of about 30 days are made The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of approximately every six months, mostly from the the Army, would note that another important aspect of the recent appterxi Bal iev e s m , mintroduction of Flogger ground attack aircraft lies in the fact that Northern and Baltic Fleets. A typical force consists of it could presage the introduction of these aircraft in more two surface combatants, one or two submarines, and a significant numbers. In the context of a NATO-Pact war, these logistic ship. The force makes port calls in Havana and aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots, could conceivably be used in Cienfuegos for provisioning and crew rest, and some attacks against ground targets throughout the Caribbean basin, to include the southeastern United States. While the Soviets wouldunits exercise with the Cuban Navy and make brief have to calculate the response such attacks would incur, the excursions into the Gulf of Mexico. Bear D reconnais- prospect that they are developing such a capability should not be sance aircraft regularly deploy to Havana, sometimes overlooked. A-5 To'Seera
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.