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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
a few surface combatants, a torpedo-attack submarine, coincident with visits of Soviet naval ships. The Soviets
and several auxiliaries. In addition, a number of Soviet would probably consider any major operations in the
naval auxiliaries regularly deploy to the South Atlantic Caribbean infeasible.
for intelligence collection and research operations.
Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea and 26. Whether Cuba would initiate hostilities against
occasionally some units en route to the Indian Ocean the United States during the early stages of a European
occaionllysomunts n ruteto he ndin Oean war would be primarily Havana's decision. In our
reprovision at Conakry, but Soviet use of support wr would be na'sd o Inpour
facilities ashore there remains limited. The Soviet view, however, the Soviets would be unlikely to expect
Navyalsousesportfacilitiesashoretains B e d A obt a significant Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but the Warsaw Pact. Cuba lacks the resources to transport
couldn e t alarge forces overseas, and those already deployed
Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft occasionally aroa or eresu wh the Soviewould
deply t AnolaUs ofthee arcrftin onjnctoi1 abroad would require support which the Soviets would
deploy to Angola. Use of these aircraft, in conjunction find extremely difficult to provide. While the Cuban
with others operating from Cuba, could provide the armed forces have been equipped for many years with
Soviets with a reconnaissance capability in the South armednforcesdhavefbee epors
Atlantic in the opening stages of a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few
recently introduced Flogger interceptor and ground
not count on continued access during a war, attack aircraft) capable of striking the southern United
States or US forces in the Caribbean, Castro would
Operations in the Caribbean have to consider that offensive actions against the
United States during the early stages of a NATO-
25. The Soviets have military advisers in Cuba and Warsaw Pact war could result in decisive US
send some personnel there to train, but -they have no retaliation."
ground, air, or naval units permanently stationed --
there. Naval deployments of about 30 days are made The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
approximately every six months, mostly from the the Army, would note that another important aspect of the recent
appterxi Bal iev e s m , mintroduction of Flogger ground attack aircraft lies in the fact that
Northern and Baltic Fleets. A typical force consists of it could presage the introduction of these aircraft in more
two surface combatants, one or two submarines, and a significant numbers. In the context of a NATO-Pact war, these
logistic ship. The force makes port calls in Havana and aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots, could conceivably be used in
Cienfuegos for provisioning and crew rest, and some attacks against ground targets throughout the Caribbean basin, to
include the southeastern United States. While the Soviets wouldunits exercise with the Cuban Navy and make brief have to calculate the response such attacks would incur, the
excursions into the Gulf of Mexico. Bear D reconnais- prospect that they are developing such a capability should not be
sance aircraft regularly deploy to Havana, sometimes overlooked.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.