Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

a few surface combatants, a torpedo-attack submarine, coincident with visits of Soviet naval ships. The Soviets
and several auxiliaries. In addition, a number of Soviet would probably consider any major operations in the
naval auxiliaries regularly deploy to the South Atlantic Caribbean infeasible.
for intelligence collection and research operations.
Soviet surface combatants on patrol off Guinea and 26. Whether Cuba would initiate hostilities against
occasionally some units en route to the Indian Ocean the United States during the early stages of a European
occaionllysomunts n ruteto he ndin Oean war would be primarily Havana's decision. In our
reprovision at Conakry, but Soviet use of support wr would be na'sd o Inpour
facilities ashore there remains limited. The Soviet view, however, the Soviets would be unlikely to expect
Navyalsousesportfacilitiesashoretains B e d A obt a significant Cuban military contribution in support of
Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but the Warsaw Pact. Cuba lacks the resources to transport
couldn e t alarge forces overseas, and those already deployed
Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft occasionally aroa or eresu wh the Soviewould
deply t AnolaUs ofthee arcrftin onjnctoi1 abroad would require support which the Soviets would
deploy to Angola. Use of these aircraft, in conjunction find extremely difficult to provide. While the Cuban
with others operating from Cuba, could provide the armed forces have been equipped for many years with
Soviets with a reconnaissance capability in the South armednforcesdhavefbee epors
Atlantic in the opening stages of a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few
recently introduced Flogger interceptor and ground
not count on continued access during a war, attack aircraft) capable of striking the southern United
States or US forces in the Caribbean, Castro would
Operations in the Caribbean have to consider that offensive actions against the
United States during the early stages of a NATO-
25. The Soviets have military advisers in Cuba and Warsaw Pact war could result in decisive US
send some personnel there to train, but -they have no retaliation."
ground, air, or naval units permanently stationed --
there. Naval deployments of about 30 days are made The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
approximately every six months, mostly from the the Army, would note that another important aspect of the recent
appterxi Bal iev e s m , mintroduction of Flogger ground attack aircraft lies in the fact that
Northern and Baltic Fleets. A typical force consists of it could presage the introduction of these aircraft in more
two surface combatants, one or two submarines, and a significant numbers. In the context of a NATO-Pact war, these
logistic ship. The force makes port calls in Havana and aircraft, flown by Soviet pilots, could conceivably be used in
Cienfuegos for provisioning and crew rest, and some attacks against ground targets throughout the Caribbean basin, to
include the southeastern United States. While the Soviets wouldunits exercise with the Cuban Navy and make brief have to calculate the response such attacks would incur, the
excursions into the Gulf of Mexico. Bear D reconnais- prospect that they are developing such a capability should not be
sance aircraft regularly deploy to Havana, sometimes overlooked.
A-5
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