Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top Se-e es Operations in the Indian Ocean effect during a short European war. If a NATO-Pact war were prolonged and if continued Western access 19. The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become a factor, the Indian Ocean, normally consisting of six to eight Soviets might attempt to increase their submarine surface combatants, a diesel-powered torpedo attack operations in the area. However, because of the long submarine, and 10 to 12 support ships drawn mainly distances between naval bases in the USSR and the from the Pacific Fleet. This force has been occasion- Indian Ocean, the Soviets would probably concentrate ally augmented during the past few years in reaction any such increased submarine operations on areas to crises and during interfleet transits. The Soviet closer to the ports of destination. At the same time ouster from Somalia deprived the Indian Ocean they might attempt to cut off the flow by attacking the Squadron of its shore support facilities in Somalia, but oilfields in the Middle East with other forces. it has subsequently acquired access to the Ethiopian ports of Assab and Massawa and increased its use of Operations in the Middle East the PDRY (South Yemen) port of Aden. We do not expect a. large-scale augmentation of Soviet naval 23. Soviet operations in the Middle East during a forces in the Indian Ocean during the initial period of Pact-NATO war would almost certainly be intended a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. to interrupt the supply of oil to the West, inasmuch as there is no viable military threat to the USSR from the 20. Currently, Western naval forces in the Indian area. While the prospect of denying Middle East oil to' Ocean far outnumber Soviet naval combatants. The the West would be tempting to the Soviets, we do not US force usually consists of two destroyers and a believe that they would undertake major ground or command support ship. Three or four times a year this airborne operations in the Persian Gulf area during the force is augmented for about six weeks by a US naval early stages of a Pact-NATO war because to do so force led by a cruiser or an aircraft carrier. The would involve the use of forces which could be needed French maintain the largest naval force in the Indian against NATO. In addition, the Soviets probably Ocean-usually consisting of two destroyers, five frig- would consider operations in the Persian Gulf to be ates, and four corvettes-and keep a fighter-bomber impractical during a NATO-Pact war, because their squadron at Djibouti. This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to mented by an aircraft carrier. The British Royal Navy the area in significant numbers and would be very does not keep a permanent force in the area, but difficult to maintain. Although ground operations occasionally deploys four or five frigates there for through Iran would be feasible, we have no evidence short visits en route to the Far East. In addition to that the Soviets would undertake such operations these Western forces, both India and Iran maintain during the initial phase of a war and believe that the naval forces in the area. Soviets would prefer instead to reserve most of their 21. Because of its small size, the Soviet Indian forces in the Transcaucasus Military District for use Ocean force would be unable to exercise sea control in against Turkey. Soviet capabilities for airstrikes in the the area against the combined Western forces. In area, however, are much greater and such attacks peacetime, the force performs primarily a political/ might occur if aircraft were available.A psychological function to enhance the USSR's prestige along the littoral. The most lucrative naval targets in Operations in the South Atlantic the area are the sea lines of communication that 24. Soviet naval forces in the South Atlantic lack air connect the oilfields of the Middle East with Western cover and are not prepared for extended wartime Europe, the United States, and Japan. This route is operations there. The Soviet force normally comprises - highly vulnerable to disruption, but the overall bal- ance of forces in the area and the relative lack of s The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Soviet submarines there raise doubts as to whether the Army, would note that, while the Soviets probably would not even the Soviets would expect their Indian Ocean undertake major ground or airborne operations in the PersianGulf forces to initiate and maintain a significant interdic- during the early stages of a NATO-Pact war, they would probably consider such operations subsequently. The objective of these tion campaign. They might seek, however, to disrupt operations would be the securing of Middle East oil sources, rather Western shipping by mining straits and choke points than only interdicting the flow of oil to the West. Under these or by other means. circumstances, Soviet forces in the Transcaucasus, North Cauca- sus, and Turkestan Military Districts, for example, might well be 22. The Soviets might question whether an interdic- employed in ground and airborne operations through Iran into the tion campaign would be felt soon enough to have any Persian Gulf area. A-4 TarSecret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.