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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top Se-e es
Operations in the Indian Ocean effect during a short European war. If a NATO-Pact
war were prolonged and if continued Western access
19. The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become a factor, the
Indian Ocean, normally consisting of six to eight Soviets might attempt to increase their submarine
surface combatants, a diesel-powered torpedo attack operations in the area. However, because of the long
submarine, and 10 to 12 support ships drawn mainly distances between naval bases in the USSR and the
from the Pacific Fleet. This force has been occasion- Indian Ocean, the Soviets would probably concentrate
ally augmented during the past few years in reaction any such increased submarine operations on areas
to crises and during interfleet transits. The Soviet closer to the ports of destination. At the same time
ouster from Somalia deprived the Indian Ocean they might attempt to cut off the flow by attacking the
Squadron of its shore support facilities in Somalia, but oilfields in the Middle East with other forces.
it has subsequently acquired access to the Ethiopian
ports of Assab and Massawa and increased its use of Operations in the Middle East
the PDRY (South Yemen) port of Aden. We do not
expect a. large-scale augmentation of Soviet naval 23. Soviet operations in the Middle East during a
forces in the Indian Ocean during the initial period of Pact-NATO war would almost certainly be intended
a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. to interrupt the supply of oil to the West, inasmuch as
there is no viable military threat to the USSR from the
20. Currently, Western naval forces in the Indian area. While the prospect of denying Middle East oil to'
Ocean far outnumber Soviet naval combatants. The the West would be tempting to the Soviets, we do not
US force usually consists of two destroyers and a believe that they would undertake major ground or
command support ship. Three or four times a year this airborne operations in the Persian Gulf area during the
force is augmented for about six weeks by a US naval early stages of a Pact-NATO war because to do so
force led by a cruiser or an aircraft carrier. The would involve the use of forces which could be needed
French maintain the largest naval force in the Indian against NATO. In addition, the Soviets probably
Ocean-usually consisting of two destroyers, five frig- would consider operations in the Persian Gulf to be
ates, and four corvettes-and keep a fighter-bomber impractical during a NATO-Pact war, because their
squadron at Djibouti. This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to
mented by an aircraft carrier. The British Royal Navy the area in significant numbers and would be very
does not keep a permanent force in the area, but difficult to maintain. Although ground operations
occasionally deploys four or five frigates there for through Iran would be feasible, we have no evidence
short visits en route to the Far East. In addition to that the Soviets would undertake such operations
these Western forces, both India and Iran maintain during the initial phase of a war and believe that the
naval forces in the area. Soviets would prefer instead to reserve most of their
21. Because of its small size, the Soviet Indian forces in the Transcaucasus Military District for use
Ocean force would be unable to exercise sea control in against Turkey. Soviet capabilities for airstrikes in the
the area against the combined Western forces. In area, however, are much greater and such attacks
peacetime, the force performs primarily a political/ might occur if aircraft were available.A
psychological function to enhance the USSR's prestige
along the littoral. The most lucrative naval targets in Operations in the South Atlantic
the area are the sea lines of communication that 24. Soviet naval forces in the South Atlantic lack air
connect the oilfields of the Middle East with Western cover and are not prepared for extended wartime
Europe, the United States, and Japan. This route is operations there. The Soviet force normally comprises -
highly vulnerable to disruption, but the overall bal-
ance of forces in the area and the relative lack of s The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
Soviet submarines there raise doubts as to whether the Army, would note that, while the Soviets probably would not
even the Soviets would expect their Indian Ocean undertake major ground or airborne operations in the PersianGulf
forces to initiate and maintain a significant interdic- during the early stages of a NATO-Pact war, they would probably
consider such operations subsequently. The objective of these
tion campaign. They might seek, however, to disrupt operations would be the securing of Middle East oil sources, rather
Western shipping by mining straits and choke points than only interdicting the flow of oil to the West. Under these
or by other means. circumstances, Soviet forces in the Transcaucasus, North Cauca-
sus, and Turkestan Military Districts, for example, might well be
22. The Soviets might question whether an interdic- employed in ground and airborne operations through Iran into the
tion campaign would be felt soon enough to have any Persian Gulf area.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.