Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
oT~rret_ . Tsushima, Tsugaru, and La Perouse Straits to provide this view believe that the Soviets would consider it fleet commanders with surveillance of the major necessary to deploy attack submarines and conduct air passages into the Sea of Japan. reconnaissance within the western Pacific out to 1,000 to 1,500 nm from the USSR to maintain their readiness 13. The possibility of becoming embroiled in a two- to attack major US naval surface forces, especially front war against the United States, Japan, and China carriers. The holders of this view believe that Soviet in the Far Fast while fighting NATO in Europe would attacks at the onset of hostilities against any carriers weigh heavily in Moscow's decision whether to initiate operating in this area are likely because the Soviets combat operations in the Pacific. Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US Pacific Fleet as a proximity to areas from which they can launch attacks dangerous adversary to be kept outside of striking against the USSR as a military threat of sufficient distance of the USSR. Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and amphibious task groups are holders of this view, furthermore, believe that the considerable in the area within about 1,000 to 1,500 Soviets would not consider such actions against US nautical miles of the USSR. US naval forces based out forces in the Pacific, by themselves, as directly causing of Japan ordinarily are located in areas where Soviet wider hostilities with China or Japan. sea control operations would be likely. If military considerations alone pertained, the Soviets almost cer- 16. All agree that once hostilities began in the east a tainly would strike US forces within 1,000 to 1,500 nm main task of the Pacific Fleet would be the establish- of the USSR. ment of sea and air control in the waters adjacent to the Soviet Union-the Sea of Japan, the Sea of 14. There is disagreement within the Intelligence Okhotsk, and the Pacific off Petropavlovsk-and Community, however, regarding the extent to which limited sea denial tasks against carrier and amphibious larger, strategic considerations would influence initial task groups in the approaches. Operations outside Soviet naval actions in the Pacific during a war in those waters would depend in large part on US Europe. According to one view,' the possibility of strategy, and on whether the USSR was simultaneously avoiding general two-front conflict would be para- at war with China or involved with supporting the mount. Moscow would seek to avoid conflict in the Far North Koreans in a war on the Korean Peninsula. East because the prospects for early victory are far from certain, but the risks of involving massive 17. The Soviets would be concerned about any US amounts of men and equipment are great. Until it combat aircraft based at airfields in Japan (including believed conflict were unavoidable, such as if a US Okinawa). Aircraft from these bases would pose a carrier task force entered the Sea of Japan or ap- major threat to the Soviet fleet operating in the Sea of proached to within its striking range of the USSR, Japan and to naval air reconnaissance and ASW Moscow probably would direct its forces to assume a missions. The Soviets undoubtedly would bring strong posture of preparedness for conflict which would fall pressure on Japan to deny the United States the use of short of provoking conflict. Nonetheless, it would be these bases during a war and undoubtedly there would difficult, in the context of a war with NATO, for the be strong Japanese domestic pressures as well. If these Soviets to control events in the Far East, and it seems pressures were successful, the Soviets would probably likely that they would be unable to avoid hostilities take no military action against the bases. If it appeared there. that they would be used to mount an attack on the USSR or its military forces, the Soviets would almost 15. According to an alternative view,- the Soviets certainly strike them. would not seek to avoid a conflict with the United States in the Pacific to such an extent that they would 18. The Soviets do not have the capability to mount refrain from attacking any US naval forces entering large-scale ground force attacks in the Aleutians and the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, or the ap- the Alaskan mainland. US surveillance, missile track- proaches to Petropavlovsk. Additionally, the holders of ing, and air and naval facilities located in Alaska would . be attractive targets for airstrikes during a conflict in the Pacific. In deciding whether to attackThe holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency. these targets, however, the Soviets would have to The holders of this view are the Director, Bureau of Intelli- gence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense weigh the risks attending any attacks on US soil, and in Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and any event such targets probably would not receive the Director of Naval intelligence, Department of the Navy. high priority A-3 lop
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.