Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

oT~rret_ .
Tsushima, Tsugaru, and La Perouse Straits to provide this view believe that the Soviets would consider it
fleet commanders with surveillance of the major necessary to deploy attack submarines and conduct air
passages into the Sea of Japan. reconnaissance within the western Pacific out to 1,000
to 1,500 nm from the USSR to maintain their readiness
13. The possibility of becoming embroiled in a two- to attack major US naval surface forces, especially
front war against the United States, Japan, and China carriers. The holders of this view believe that Soviet
in the Far Fast while fighting NATO in Europe would attacks at the onset of hostilities against any carriers
weigh heavily in Moscow's decision whether to initiate operating in this area are likely because the Soviets
combat operations in the Pacific. Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in
Soviets clearly regard the US Pacific Fleet as a proximity to areas from which they can launch attacks
dangerous adversary to be kept outside of striking against the USSR as a military threat of sufficient
distance of the USSR. Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The
against US carrier and amphibious task groups are holders of this view, furthermore, believe that the
considerable in the area within about 1,000 to 1,500 Soviets would not consider such actions against US
nautical miles of the USSR. US naval forces based out forces in the Pacific, by themselves, as directly causing
of Japan ordinarily are located in areas where Soviet wider hostilities with China or Japan.
sea control operations would be likely. If military
considerations alone pertained, the Soviets almost cer- 16. All agree that once hostilities began in the east a
tainly would strike US forces within 1,000 to 1,500 nm main task of the Pacific Fleet would be the establish-
of the USSR. ment of sea and air control in the waters adjacent to
the Soviet Union-the Sea of Japan, the Sea of
14. There is disagreement within the Intelligence Okhotsk, and the Pacific off Petropavlovsk-and
Community, however, regarding the extent to which limited sea denial tasks against carrier and amphibious
larger, strategic considerations would influence initial task groups in the approaches. Operations outside
Soviet naval actions in the Pacific during a war in those waters would depend in large part on US
Europe. According to one view,' the possibility of strategy, and on whether the USSR was simultaneously
avoiding general two-front conflict would be para- at war with China or involved with supporting the
mount. Moscow would seek to avoid conflict in the Far North Koreans in a war on the Korean Peninsula.
East because the prospects for early victory are far
from certain, but the risks of involving massive 17. The Soviets would be concerned about any US
amounts of men and equipment are great. Until it combat aircraft based at airfields in Japan (including
believed conflict were unavoidable, such as if a US Okinawa). Aircraft from these bases would pose a
carrier task force entered the Sea of Japan or ap- major threat to the Soviet fleet operating in the Sea of
proached to within its striking range of the USSR, Japan and to naval air reconnaissance and ASW
Moscow probably would direct its forces to assume a missions. The Soviets undoubtedly would bring strong
posture of preparedness for conflict which would fall pressure on Japan to deny the United States the use of
short of provoking conflict. Nonetheless, it would be these bases during a war and undoubtedly there would
difficult, in the context of a war with NATO, for the be strong Japanese domestic pressures as well. If these
Soviets to control events in the Far East, and it seems pressures were successful, the Soviets would probably
likely that they would be unable to avoid hostilities take no military action against the bases. If it appeared
there. that they would be used to mount an attack on the
USSR or its military forces, the Soviets would almost
15. According to an alternative view,- the Soviets certainly strike them.
would not seek to avoid a conflict with the United
States in the Pacific to such an extent that they would 18. The Soviets do not have the capability to mount
refrain from attacking any US naval forces entering large-scale ground force attacks in the Aleutians and
the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, or the ap- the Alaskan mainland. US surveillance, missile track-
proaches to Petropavlovsk. Additionally, the holders of ing, and air and naval facilities located in Alaska
would . be attractive targets for airstrikes during a
conflict in the Pacific. In deciding whether to attackThe holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency. these targets, however, the Soviets would have to
The holders of this view are the Director, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense weigh the risks attending any attacks on US soil, and in
Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and any event such targets probably would not receive
the Director of Naval intelligence, Department of the Navy. high priority
A-3
lop